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This project examines the New England Emigrant Aid Company colonization of 
Kansas in 1854 as a solution to the growing debate over popular sovereignty and slave 
labor. It uses the Company as a lens to reinterpret the intellectual history of philanthropy, 
tracing its roots from Puritan ideas of charity to the capitalistic giving of the nineteenth 
century.  
It argues that the Company’s vision was simultaneously capitalistic and 
moralistic, for it served both as an imposition of “proper” society upon the West and 
South, but also had the potential to benefit the donors financially and politically. Using a 
settler colonial framework, it examines how domestic colonization project created 
hierarchical relationships between white men, Native Americans, women, and freed 
slaves. This includes an examination of how the seemingly liberal idea of philanthropy 
resulted in the removal of Native Americans from Kansas in the 1850s and discouraged 
the entry of freed slaves into the territory, despite the Company’s moral claims. It also 
studies the NEEAC’s expansion into Florida, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia, both before 
and after the Civil War. Finally, this project examines the public memorialization of the 
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As Eli Thayer neared the end of his life, long after the Civil War and political 
reconstruction ended, he continued to defend an institution created in his youth. The New 
England Emigrant Aid Company (NEEAC), which was still in the process of trying to colonize 
Florida, had begun nearly thirty years earlier in the town of Worcester, Massachusetts when 
Thayer had been struck by a divine vision. A zealous—and sometimes overbearing—man, in his 
youth Thayer chased his ideological dreams with a passion. A man of fire and brimstone, but 
also capitalism, Thayer embodied a long forgotten nineteenth century variant of philanthropy, 
which heartily mixed financial improvements with moral ones.  He summarized the 
accomplishments of the NEEAC, which gathered hundreds of followers, thusly: 
1. It stopped the making of Slave States. 
2. It made the Republican Party. 
3. It nearly elected Fremont and did elect Lincoln. 
4. It united and solidified the Northern states against slavery, and was a necessary 
training, to enable them to subdue the Rebellion. 
5. It drove the slave-holders, through desperation, into secession. 
6. It has given us a harmonious and enduring Union. 
7. It has emancipated the white race of the South, as well as the negroes, from the evils of 
Slavery. 
8. It is even now regenerating the South.1 
 
The NEEAC, Thayer claimed, achieved its success because of Northern superiority, and 
the power of free labor. Born and raised in Massachusetts, Thayer attended Brown University, 
where he subscribed to the liberal progressivism of the Unitarian faith. He then spent the 
majority of the 1840s founding and running the Oread Institute, one of the first collegiate 
programs for women. In 1853, Thayer joined the state legislature, and by 1854 he presented his 
bill for the New England Emigrant Aid Company (NEEAC) to the Massachusetts State 
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Legislature. Like many Americans Thayer found the national tensions over slavery to be an 
unavoidable problem, especially when the Kansas-Nebraska Act allowed the two newly formed 
territories to decide via popular sovereignty the legality of slavery within their borders. Many 
Northerners disparaged the Act for its direct contradiction of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, 
which prohibited slavery in the Louisiana Territory north of the thirty-sixth parallel.  Foreseeing 
the eruption of sectional challenges, Thayer reasoned that organizing a Northern emigration to 
the region would swing the vote toward the addition of a Free State to the Union.2 A full month 
before the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, Thayer launched his plan for an Emigrant Aid 
Company to the State Legislature of Massachusetts. He planned to create a society that would 
colonize Kansas with Northern settlers who possessed “the highest types of Christian manhood” 
to “prepare a way for a civilized community.”3 On April 26, 1854, he received the Governor’s 
signature on the Company’s charter, but by June his Massachusetts funding fell through. He 
sought his final charter from the Connecticut legislature, which allowed the company up to five 
million dollars worth of revenue toward colonization.4 The legislature’s astronomical five 
million dollar cap on the organization created phenomenal propagandist hype, and when 
Southerners saw such massive funding provided by a Northern state government for the 
colonization of Kansas, the sectional conflict over the region erupted into a political upheaval 
that dominated the entire session of Congress in 1854, 1856, and 1858.5 This violent conflict 
known as Bleeding Kansas bluntly foreshadowed the violence of the Civil War and escalated 
mounting sectional tensions. In the midst of this conflict, Thayer believed that the transference of 
Northern morality, rooted in the revivalism of the Second Great Awakening and the superiority 
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of a free labor economy, would triumph in a nonviolent colonization of the West and ultimately 
the South.    
By tracing how Thayer and the many other members of the NEEAC thought about 
philanthropy and colonization before and after the Civil War, we are able to understand a 
fundamental ideological thread in Northern culture. The idea of using New England philanthropy 
to civilize the West and South was steeped in years of intellectual debate, and the project came to 
revolutionize and typify a new way to incite a moral crusade. While various personalities and 
organizations offered solutions to the central antebellum conflict over slave labor, the NEEAC 
mobilized New Englanders to fund, both by capitalistic investment and donation, a northern 
emigration to secure Kansas from pro-slavery interests. They sought to impose their “vision of 
good society” upon the undecided, uncivilized West by implanting Northern ideals of anti-
slavery, temperance, education, and religion upon the current inhabitants. As the company 
successfully transplanted thousands of Northerners into the West over its first few years, the 
goals of their philanthropy expanded. The company reasoned that if the West could be civilized, 
why not pour Northern intellect and money into the South, where the evils of slave labor stifled 
the economy and the morality of its inhabitants? Even after the war, the Company continued to 
push their agenda into other ideological frontiers, including Florida and Oregon.  
The idea that money should be distributed to those in need was an idea as old as the 
nation itself.  Puritan theology focused on providing charity on an individual basis to those who 
deserved it—widows and orphans—but spurned those they deemed lazy or unworthy, often able 
bodied men. Puritan charity relied on the donor knowing the recipient well enough to judge 
whether they deserved aid. As the population of the Massachusetts Bay Colony increased 
exponentially over the next century, however, individualized charity became more difficult to 
  
4
maintain, especially with the emergence of urban areas. By the nineteenth century, the idea of 
philanthropy, a sort of collective charity, sprang forth from its earlier roots. Philanthropy allowed 
members of society to donate money to a cause they deemed moral, but put the responsibility of 
finding the recipient in the hands of the company.6  
This idea germinated in the heart of the religious revivalism of the Second Great 
Awakening, when the Protestant majority threw off the shackles of Calvinistic predestination in 
favor of a more Arminian belief in the power to earn their own salvation. This religious 
revivalism fundamentally changed the landscape of Northern culture and played a pivotal role in 
the emergence of Thayer’s colonization scheme. As the nineteenth century progressed and 
industrialism flourished, Americans struggled with the growing pains of self-definition, 
particularly when it came to their morality. America’s battle to define its morality was daunting, 
particularly for those who saw the promises of the Constitution and the Declaration of 
Independence contradicted in the legal practice of slavery. The moral difficulty was exacerbated 
by a massive population boom between the Revolution and 1845, which expanded America’s 
population from two and half million to twenty million people.7 Many new immigrants from 
rural areas settled in newly industrialized Northern cities, and as city populations grew, so did 
crime, alcoholism, and other such vices that had previously gone unnoticed by the mostly rural 
religious majority. This apparent increase in sin and immorality led to a movement that Nathan 
Hatch described as “religious populism.” 8 Religious populism challenged individuals on issues 
of morality, sin, and most importantly slavery. It was a grassroots movement of people toward 
moral change and served as “an inhibitor of genteel tradition and a recurring source of new 
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religious movements.”9 The seed of this new revivalism, and the advent of the Second Great 
Awakening, lay in the struggle between Calvinistic and Enlightenment rationalist views of 
religion. While the former stressed natural depravity and God’s wrath, the latter focused on 
innate goodness, free will, and reasonableness.10  
This desire not merely with achieving personal salvation but also with shaping the 
morality of the surrounding world stemmed at least in part from the rising popularity of 
millennialism. Millennialism in the Second Great Awakening suggested that if people 
collectively behaved correctly, they could facilitate the Second Coming of Christ. Various strains 
of millennialism also held that the Second Coming would incite a golden age of a thousand year 
period during which Jesus would rule the Earth, a notion that Baptist minister William Miller 
further intensified with his prediction that the Second Coming would occur in 1843. The fervor 
of the Second Coming of Christ mixed with the Second Great Awakening’s emphasis on free 
will excited notions by the religious to not only expunge themselves of personal sin, but to 
eradicate collective sin via spirited opposition to immorality.  
The principles that the Second Great Awakening emphasized were free will, the 
purification of national sins, and the immediacy of salvation, which played a fundamental role in 
shaping Thayer’s ideas about the colonization of Kansas. Thayer claimed that he conceived the 
notion for the society from a divine intervention from God, a theological idea that Calvinists 
considered evidence of damnation, but Second Great Awakening revivalists championed as a 
sign of God’s benevolence and free will.11  
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As these strains of religion demanded that individuals examine their own behavior more 
stringently, many Northeasterners expanded this mission beyond the private sphere, seeking to 
both mend their own souls and the collective soul of the nation. Unlike the Puritanical vision of 
personal giving to the poor, philanthropy, under the paradigm shift of the Second Great 
Awakening, required the giver to take a more significant, broader approach. This meant that 
philanthropy encompassed more than just serving the poor; it could fight atheism, illiteracy, or 
drunkenness, making it the perfect tool with which to save the nation’s collective soul. Lawrence 
J. Friedman argues in his essay “Philanthropy in America: Historicism and its Discontents” that 
early philanthropists sought “to impose their vision of good society through collective 
missionary-like (religious and secular) ventures.”12 Inspired by this new way of transforming the 
morality of the nation, benevolent associations for all sorts of social ills and moral evils sprang 
up around the country, determined that money could create a unified, Christian nation.  
This re-envisioning of philanthropy also reflected the increasing popularity and 
importance of utopian colonies in this era. Between 1825 and 1860, Americans, particularly 
those from Millennial religious sects, formed over one hundred utopian colonies in the Northeast 
and Midwest.13 Many revivalist Protestant sects, bolstered by their millennial desire to create a 
morally pure nation before the Second Coming of Christ, believed that model colonies “could 
peacefully reshape its competitive society into an order resembling the Christian ideal of 
universal brotherhood.”14 Thayer’s plans for settlements in Kansas did not breach social 
conventions in the way one might consider Oneida colony’s principles of free love, but it did 
possess some semblance of communalism and idealism. Within the context of revivalist views on 
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morality and theology, Thayer’s colonization scheme both satisfied the utopian ideal of creating 
pure Christian communities and worked toward the redemption of the souls of the fallen nation. 
Thayer wrote that the NEEAC’s duty was to “spread Christianity over the world, it is a precedent 
obligation resting on us to prepare the waste places of the earth for its reception.”15 The idea of 
colonization garnered the support of Northern religious subscribers through its focus on 
purifying American sin caused by the evils of slavery. 
This project examines the NEEAC as a lens through which to reinterpret the intellectual 
history of philanthropy, tracing its roots from Puritan ideas of charity to the capitalistic giving of 
the nineteenth century. In the historiography of philanthropy, most work has focused on the 
twentieth century, and work on the nineteenth has been almost exclusively urban-focused. Robert 
H. Bremner’s 1960 book American Philanthropy defines philanthropy as the desire by the 
philanthropist to seek “improvement in the quality of human life.”16 This definition of 
philanthropy is too broad, as it fails to see the hierarchical relationships created by 
philanthropists to “improve” the lives of others through practices of settler colonialism. Bremner 
also “assumed that Americans had always debated within the context of a general and 
fundamental consensus or accord on the values of liberal capitalism, political democracy, and 
marketplace.”17 This project will demonstrate that nineteenth century perceptions of philanthropy 
were shaped by the specific constraints of the period.    
Since Bremner, other historians have argued that philanthropists sought solely to control 
the lower class and gain profits.18 While this view is enticing, it ignores the fact that 
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philanthropists honestly believed in their missions, and it was not unusual for them to believe 
wholeheartedly in the inherent morality of capitalism.  
My project steps outside of these constraints by contextualizing the NEEAC’s 
colonization projects within the nineteenth century, to explain how they justified their 
“civilizing” mission against slavery, while also examining the effects its colonization had on the 
people it sought to change. This study looks at the specific conditions of the nineteenth century, 
especially on the Northeastern states, to provide a more complex ideological structure of 
philanthropists both before and after the Civil War.  
 In chapter one I argue that the Company’s vision for colonization was simultaneously 
capitalistic and moralistic, for it served both as an imposition of proper society upon the West, 
but also had the potential to benefit the donors morally, financially, and politically. It 
investigates the NEEAC’s ties to republicanism, free labor ideology, and religion as they 
convinced Northerners of their project’s importance.  
In chapter two, I examine Kansas as a settler colonial enterprise through the lived 
experiences of the settlers who went to Kansas with the Company. The NEEAC’s founders and 
settlers envisioned their settlements as benevolent enterprises that would only benefit the 
territories. They sought to improve the “vacant” land with familial migration. As colonial 
theorists Ann Stoler and Carole McGranahan note, however, in this process colonists “create 
new subjects that must be relocated to be productive and exploitable, dispossessed to be modern, 
disciplined to be independent, converted to be human, stripped of old cultural bearings to be 
citizens, coerced to be free.”19The NEEAC’s aim to transform the West into a reflection of New 
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England necessitated the creation of a region free of “uncivilized” Native culture, to be obtained 
either through removal or assimilation.  
Chapter three examines NEEAC projects in West Texas, Virginia, Florida, and Oregon. 
This chapter demonstrates the Company’s commitment to furthering their ideologies of 
philanthropic colonialism into areas they deemed in need of civilization. It examines the shifts in 
their philosophies after the war and further complicates the image of the NEEAC, which is most 
often only associated with their work in Kansas. I demonstrate that these ideas went beyond the 
Civil War and continued into the postbellum generation.  
Chapter four examines the historical memory of the NEEAC, and specifically how 
Thayer sought to form the memory of the company in the public sphere. I examine a debate 
between Thayer and the followers of abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison after the war. I argue 
that the ideological differences between the two groups from the antebellum period persisted 
well after the Civil War.  
Overall, this project seeks to understand the ideologies of nineteenth century philanthropy 
and its connections to capitalism, morality, and colonialism. The NEEAC, while perhaps 
remembered most fondly for its role in perpetuating Bleeding Kansas, provides an excellent lens 
through which to trace American ideas about philanthropy and progress as they moved West, 
immigrated South, fought in a Civil War, and tried to rebuild a nation. 
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Chapter One: Ideological Origins 
 
 
Hush, my babe, lie still and slumber, 
‘Only’ Wise will guard thy head 
From the Abolition Thayer,  
Who on little boys is fed. 
 
Black Republicans are coming  
To devour us, hip and thigh,  
But our good old sword of State will 
Chaw them up at Phillippi.  
 
So, my babe, snore on in safety,  
Eli Thayer won’t eatch you yet--- 
And, when he approaches near us,  
A sound spanking he will get.  
 
For our Wise is brave and valiant;  
Very fond of fight is he,  
 
And, if Eli Thayer ain’t cautious,  
Tarred and feathered he will be.  
 
 -The South Side Democrat, March 9, 1854 
 
When Eli Thayer opened the doors of the New England Emigrant Aid Company 
(NEEAC) in May 1854, his company immediately entered a political firestorm. Southerners, like 
the writers of this poem, vehemently opposed the anti-slavery mission of the company. The 
followers of William Lloyd Garrison, who supported immediate abolition, also rejected the 
Company’s commitment to the gradual abolition of slavery. Despite the opposition from these 
more radical factions of society, the Company’s mission embraced ideas that were popular to the 
common New Englander—non-violence, popular sovereignty, gradual abolition, free labor, and 
republicanism.  
The Company opened with one goal—to make the Kansas Territory a free state. The 
founders reasoned that a steady immigration of New Englanders to the Kansas Territory would 
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“establish the reign of justice and humanity” that would “come off triumphant in the great 
struggle against slavery and governmental might.”1 By financially supporting emigrants to the 
territory, the Company hoped that New England values of free labor and republicanism would 
sway the vote toward freedom and transform the undecided West into a reflection of 
Northeastern values and morals. While their goal was singular, the idea of using New England 
philanthropy to civilize the West was anything but simple. The ideological roots of the NEEAC’s 
mission were part of a hotly contested battle between anti-slavery gradualists, abolitionists, 
capitalists, and utopianists, all of whom sought the best solution to the problem of slavery.  
The idea of using colonization to gradually rid the nation of slave labor imitated a slightly 
different, but popular idea. Thayer’s scheme harkened back to the American Colonization 
Society (ACS) movement, which famously sought to colonize Liberia with freed slaves as a way 
to gradually eradicate slavery. The NEEAC, in many ways, promoted a similar idea. Both 
societies favored a gradual form of emancipation by colonization so as to avoid violence and 
presented relatively little inconvenience to Southern plantation owners, as the method did not 
stipulate mandatory participation. The NEEAC differed from the ACS, however, in its attempt to 
colonize white settlers domestically. Rather than remove slaves, thus removing the problem 
altogether, the NEEAC focused on an ideological transformation. Unlike the ACS, which tried to 
remain neutral on sectional issues, Thayer insisted that his stream of Northern immigrants, 
“clothed with moral power, enjoying the confidence, and wielding the pecuniary resources of the 
whole body of Anti-Slavery men in the North” would transform the South with popular 
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sovereignty to embrace not only Northern conceptions of morality, but also free labor.2 The 
difference between the ACS, which reached its pinnacle of popularity in the early nineteenth 
century when it successfully founded Liberia in 1822, and the NEEAC, which functioned in the 
mid-nineteenth century, showed the immense changes that the Second Great Awakening brought 
upon American Protestantism and the increasing intensity of sectionalism over issues of free 
versus slave labor.  
Historians have generally been skeptical of the NEEAC as a morally motivated company 
and instead surmise that its proposed ambitions were merely a front for land speculation in the 
West. In some of the most comprehensive overviews of the Kansas-Nebraska conflict, the 
NEEAC is dismissed as a minor episode in a much larger political battle, and the founders are 
portrayed as opportunistic businessmen. In Bleeding Kansas, Nicole Etcheson argues that 
contributors to the NEEAC and their emigrants thought slavery was immoral, but this was 
secondary to their primary concern of obtaining land.3  In his book Race and Politics: “Bleeding 
Kansas” and the Coming of the Civil War, James Rawley is similarly dismissive of the “futile” 
company, noting that the members were largely anti-abolitionist and that Thayer’s sole purpose 
was to make money.4 Samuel Johnson’s The Battle Cry of Freedom: The New England Emigrant 
Aid Company in the Kansas Crusade focuses on the economics of the New England Emigrant 
Aid Company, and Johnson argues that Thayer believed he had a moral task, but that he used the 
company mostly as a political ploy, losing interest part way through the project. Overall, the 
scholarship on the NEEAC has been apprehensive to admit that the company could have sincere 
moral objectives along with their financial ones. 
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Despite doubts on the sincerity of the morality of the NEEAC’s mission, the company 
truly believed that morality and capitalism could and should be intertwined.  The NEEAC 
showcased the centrality of capitalism and republicanism to the ideology of Northerners in this 
era, as well as the power of philanthropy as a colonizing force. Unlike a modern day 
philanthropic organization, the NEEAC was anything but “non-profit” and Thayer asserted 
that the company “was meant to be a money making affair as well as a philanthropic 
undertaking.”5 Morality and capitalism were intrinsically tied in the republican belief that 
individualism, even in charity, was essential to the creation of a good society.  
Immediately after forming the company, Thayer called upon various Boston 
philanthropists and businessmen to make up the backbone of the NEEAC. Notable company 
members included Amos A. Lawrence, a wealthy merchant and famous philanthropist who 
supported a variety of causes and bankrolled early company efforts. With Lawrence as the 
business connection, Edward Everett Hale, a Worcester resident and well-known Unitarian 
minister, connected the company to the money and support of New England churches. Original 
company members had diverse careers, as doctors, lawyers, merchants, politicians, and 
journalists, but always tended to have some means.6 While Thayer mainly played the role of 
visionary and promoter, the secretary of the Company Thomas H. Webb handled the majority of 
the work in informing settlers of the Company’s benefits, which included reduced fare to the 
territory and assistance upon settlement.  
Thayer and Lawrence quickly disagreed ideologically on the best way to raise funds for 
the Company’s mission. For Thayer, the plan was “to form a business company, to be conducted 
upon business principles, able to make good dividends to its stockholders annually, at its close a 
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full return of all the money originally invested,” whereas Lawrence saw the company as nothing 
more than an expense charity.7 The fundamental disagreement stemmed from a basic difference 
in the ideology of the two men, mainly that Thayer subscribed to the increasingly popular 
ideology of republicanism, whereas Lawrence rejected it.8 
 The republican model for good society focused extensively on the concept of free labor, 
and not only decried slave labor as immoral, but also served, as Eric Foner argues in Free Soil, 
Free Labor, Free Men as “an affirmation of the superiority of the social system of the North—a 
dynamic, expanding, capitalistic society, whose achievements and destiny were almost wholly 
the result of the dignity and opportunities which it offered the average laboring man.”9 
Republicanism focused on increasing workers’ social mobility and held this value as the pinnacle 
of success. Slavery, at its very base, clashed with the ideology of free labor, as it did not provide 
the institutions or opportunities for workers to improve their conditions.10 The West became 
essential to the practical application of Free Labor ideology in the antebellum period as it served 
as an outlet for those seeking an improved condition.11 Republicans reasoned that if the 
population growth in urbanizing cities drove the prices of goods up, emigration to the West could 
relieve the pressure of growth and expand the economic opportunities to those who most needed 
it.  
It is important to note, however, that although as a whole the NEEAC leaders subscribed 
to what they called republicanism, they shunned partisan politics. The company voted, in fact, 
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that “the NE Emigrant Aid Company disclaims all interference in Party politics and its list of 
subscribers shows the names of representatives of every political port in New England.”12 This 
dismissal of politics followed the stagnation of Congress, in which Company members, 
especially Thayer, saw the Republican Party either being too aggressive (abolitionists) or too 
willing to compromise. Thayer thought that abolitionists wanted “to put slavery to rest by 
destroying the church, the constitution, and union.”13 He took the position that while immediate 
abolitionists like Garrison were impractical, radical, and violent, his plan was more carefully 
thought out. Thayer called the moderate Republicans “political Cassandras” a reference to the 
daughter of the Trojan King Priam, who due to a curse could see the future, but could do nothing 
about it.14 Thayer found the Free Soil Party, which opposed slavery extension from a legal 
perspective equally as ineffective as moderates. He called them a “feeble organization,” which 
by 1854, “had scarcely increased at all, either in influence or numbers.”15 In both cases, he 
reasoned that ignoring partisan politics and pursuing a republican grassroots movement of the 
people was the best way to free Kansas. 
The NEEAC’s first settlement in Lawrence featured communal farming equipment 
including “steam sawmills, gristmills, and other such machines as shall be of constant service in 
a new settlement, which cannot, however be purchased or carried out conveniently by individual 
settlers. These machines may be leased or run by the Company’s agents.”16 The Company also 
provided a communal boarding house for the colonists until they were able to settle in the area, a 
newspaper that explained the company’s moral values and expectations, and a company run 
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hotel. These amenities worked toward two purposes: they provided an economic incentive for 
emigrants to settle in the area and to utilize the services of the NEEAC, and they emphasized that 
even if northerners did not move to Kansas for explicitly ideological purposes, their inherent 
Northern morality would transform the land nonetheless via their press and established churches.   
These utopian ideals, however, did not clash with the capitalistic goals of republicanism, 
which promoted the idea that morality and capitalism were connected, and the best way of 
serving God on Earth was the pursuit of wealth.17As a proponent of republicanism and Free 
Labor, Thayer noted retrospectively that, “I had not then, and have not now, the slightest respect 
for that pride in charity which excludes from great philanthropic enterprise the strength and the 
effectiveness of money-making…Why is it worse for a company to make money by extending 
Christianity than by making cotton cloth?”18 For Thayer and other New England philanthropists, 
Christianity and capitalism did not need to be exclusive, and the transformation of theology 
assisted in their argument. Thayer criticized Lawrence and other more traditional philanthropists, 
who had seen the enterprise as charitable, rather than philanthropic.  He criticized them as 
figments of the past, “who did not think it wise to ‘lower the Christian standard’ so much as to 
reap a profit from Christian work to insure further Christian progress.”19  
In the end, the Company compromised on their strategies for obtaining funding. When it 
dealt with ministers and church organizations, the company appointed “an energetic and 
unsuspecting man” to persuade the congregations to make charitable donations, a more 
traditional form of personal philanthropy.20 That man was the Reverend Edward Everett Hale, 
whose efforts at fundraising reached 3,050 New England ministers. When the Company issued a 
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circular to clergy in 1854 asking for money, they asked the recipient’s “particular attention to the 
encouragement which divine Providence has given to its efforts.”21 The NEEAC had four 
intentions for its colonies in Kansas listed in the following order—freedom, religion to bolster 
the notion of freedom (they “understood that to make a free state, they needed, first of all the 
Gospel”), education, and temperance.22 It is clear from these letters that the NEEAC was first 
and foremost concerned with making Kansas a free state, but also that they were innately 
concerned with the spread of their moral program.  
 Many New Englanders celebrated and supported this mission with zeal. One minister 
proclaimed that they should insert “an anti-slavery spirit into that swelling population” and yet 
another prayed that God “will deliver us from servile, Judas-like rulers, who ‘unbind not the 
heavy burdens of the poor.’”23 The response was immense, especially in the early days of the 
Company, and Hale’s speaking tours increased the Company bankroll. One company member 
was so impressed by Hale’s ability to raise funds that he said that Hale “put the paper bullets into 
them till they surrender [their money].”24 Far from picky about where they received funding, the 
Company accepted money from any Protestant denomination. In their appeal for funding, Hale’s 
committee was “fully impressed with the importance of hastening forward every good work,” 
regardless of denomination. This idea was clearly influenced by the greater acceptance of 
Arminianism in the Second Great Awakening, which promoted working toward perfection, and 
also proved a handy tool in obtaining maximum returns on the appeal.25 
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 These churchgoers had a more traditional view of philanthropy, one that more closely 
mimicked Puritan ideas of charity, but to those potential donors who subscribed to republicanism 
and Free Labor ideology, the company offered a more lucrative financial option. Investors could 
buy shares in the NEEAC and when the Company sold its land investments after ensuring 
Kansas’s freedom, investors would be able to cash out their original investment for a profit. The 
Company charter stated, “The capital stock of said corporation shall be divided into shares of one 
hundred dollars each; but no more than four dollars on the share shall be assessed during the year 
eighteen hundred and fifty-four, and no more than ten dollars on the share shall be assessed in 
any one year thereafter.”26 
To attract these business-minded men, the company employed various strategies. Thayer 
made an extensive speaking tour around New England. He promoted the venture to men’s clubs, 
city councils, and universities, and the Company also sent letters to the most prominent members 
of their societies, stating as in this letter from December of 1855: 
We wish you to consult with your monied men, and appoint an evening, Sunday next 
week, when we can have an interview with them, at your counting room, or residence, in 
order to make a plain statement of facts, and obtain from them some substantial evidence 
of their sympathy and interest in the success of the glorious enterprise in which we are 
engaged.27  
 
These form letters, much like the fundraising techniques of a modern non-profit, 
specifically targeted those who had enough money to make large donations. By 1858, the 
Company was so reliant on stock subscriptions for its operations that Secretary Thomas H. Webb 
wrote, “Our sole reliance for successfully carrying out the great enterprise in which we are 
engaged is for the future upon what we may realize from the investments which have been made 
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in the territory.”28 At the same time, however, the letters did not present the venture as purely 
economic. They called on the donors’ sympathetic spirit and promised a moral and financial 
benefit from subscribing.   
To both charitable givers and stock subscribers, the Company did not believe they were 
merely providing an opportunity for land or settlement. Rather, they believed this to be a moral 
service to the men who donated, and to the families they sent to Kansas. Company agent John 
Brown29 reasoned that New Englanders were “willing to do something dignified to take up a 
cross to deny themselves,” and with but a grain of faith, “men can build a railroad—they can fit 
out ships for northern papers—they can skew millions to carry a presidential campaigns, and 
can’t they do something for Christianity? Can’t they build up the colleges and churches and 
Institutions?”30 Brown reasoned that because businessmen would presumably already be 
involved in Western land speculation, they might as well obtain the spiritual benefits of 
expanding Christianity. Aside from the personal financial benefits of giving, Brown figured that 
“it would do men good to give,” and not only affect the undecided nature of the “uncivilized” 
West, it would provide aid for the donor’s personal salvation.31  
The Company founders also believed that the settlers would benefit both morally and 
financially. Ephriam Nute, a Unitarian Minister in the first colony of Lawrence, wrote to Amos 
Lawrence in 1855 reminding him that the best way to ensure the freedom of Kansas was “to give 
us a few thousand of the substantial men with families early next spring and induce your 
capabiliest [sic] to invest, invest, invest. Loan funds to the settlers. Taking good security and 
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reasonable interest help them benefit their claim and get a start at farming.”32 True to republican 
ideology, this philanthropy was not synonymous with charity. The company would provide 
inducements for settlers to emigrate, which mainly included a reduced fare and also sought to 
provide services once the settlers arrived. The company charter stated that the purpose of the 
company was to: 
carry them to their homes more cheaply than they could other- wise go - to enable them to 
establish themselves with the least inconvenience, and to provide the most important prime 
necessities of a new colony. It will provide shelter and food at the lowest prices after the 
arrival of emigrants, while they make the arrangements necessary for their new homes. It will 
render all the assistance which the information of its agents can give.33 
 
The Company even expected that its own agents to improve themselves and encouraged them 
to pursue their own private interests while on the job. Samuel Pomeroy, who became an agent of 
the Company in Kansas and later one of the State’s first Senators, exemplified how free labor 
ideology translated into practical application. When he wrote the Company on May 21, 1854 to 
request employment, his goals were two-fold. He wrote that he, “had a special interest in the 
location of a Roads and mills and of ascertaining the natural facilities for the water power,” but 
also that he was “anxious to have the right impetuous given to its [Kansas’s] early settlement. 
That the best principles of our resting fathers may be transplanted there and that thus our untold 
domain may be saved from the blighting—withering—deadening—damning influence of 
American Slavery!!”34 While Pomeroy was certainly interested in the moralizing quality of the 
operation, he did not view philanthropy as an idea that excluded personal gain. The Company 
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responded to his inquiry positively, giving him permission on April 28,, 1855, “to make 
investments in Kansas Territory for his private benefit.”35  
Although the Company desired its agents to help the immigrants first and foremost, they 
fully anticipated that they would skim money off the top of their investments or start their own 
side ventures. This happened so often, that sometimes the agents could not be found by the 
settlers because they were roaming the territory tending to their personal business. On one 
occasion this left an entire company of German immigrants stuck at the Company hotel for a 
week while Pomeroy was located.36 Charles Robinson, the first Governor of Kansas, originally 
came to the region as an agent of the Company, and used his power as an agent to gain political 
power. When he left his post with the NEEAC to pursue a full time career in politics, the 
company noted that he could “serve Kansas better” if he were to pursue his private interest.37  
This advice extended beyond even the Company agents, but served as a personal philosophy 
for all workers. In a private letter, Thomas Webb advised Martin F. Conway, a correspondent for 
the Baltimore Sun in Kansas, that he had “done quite your share of public labor” and advised him 
to focus “more exclusively to profession and business attentions” in order to improve his 
material possession and public advancement.”38  
In terms of the moral expectations of the Company, Thomas Webb argued that they could not 
win “merely pitting men and money against men and money” but that they “must stem the tide, 
and turn back the torrent by intellectual and moral power.”39 It was truly important to the 
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founders that their employees made both moral and financial gains. Pomeroy, who would 
become a famous name in the railroad speculating business after the Civil War, and is often 
viewed as a Company member who cared very little about anything but his personal gain, in fact 
exhibited his commitment to Protestant, republican morality in numerous circumstances, 
especially when it came to temperance. Once, when asked to prove the character of the 
Southerners in Kansas, he recalled a time that he met up with some of them at a Kansas hotel. 
The Southerners asked him, “a thousand and one times to drink with them,” which he politely 
declined.40  He later chastised this behavior as an example of their barbarism and inferiority to 
Northerners. In this way, although many NEEAC agents were gallivanting in their own private 
interests, they often represented the ideological goals of the Company.   
This Company policy did backfire on a few occasions, however. Agent Charles Branscomb 
skimmed money from the profits of the communal Company mill. Although the Company did 
cut off his funding in April 1858, when Thomas Webb frantically wrote M.G. Coming that 
rumors about Branscomb had “shaken the executive committee’s confidence in Mr. B,” they did 
not seek his formal dismissal.41 Further speculation fell on Company Agent B. Slater, who 
personally asked Amos Lawrence for an unauthorized bonus. Thomas Webb kindly wrote Slater, 
remarking that he was “somewhat perplexed” at seeing that he had taken a suspicious amount of 
money from the Company accounts.42 Slater immediately proposed “deferring the matter until 
next July,” at which Webb became irate.43 In both cases, neither man was fired, nor was any 
legal action taken by the Company against its rogue agents. They had set the parameters, and 
they seemed frustrated but unsurprised at the fraudulent actions. 
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The Company even had to fight to get is loan back from George Washington Brown, whom 
they had helped start the first free press in Lawrence. When Webb wrote Brown in 1857, 
reminding him that, “prosperity having smiled upon you, and a cheering prospect presenting for 
the future, this is deemed a fitting time to call your attention to the subject.”44 Brown responded 
that the Company had not assisted him in the least, and that “it seems to me you do one gross 
injustice for you to claim that ‘we established’ that office when the only thing that ‘we’ did was 
to loan me some money to enable me to hurry my movements Kansas.”45 Eventually the 
Company tried to cut ties with many of their problematic agents, and revised their instructions to 
agents to be harsher. However, in the early days of the Company, the policy of letting agents do 
whatever they needed to in order to improve led to disorder and financial losses.  
Despite these internal struggles, the Company truly wanted settlers to improve their condition 
upon moving to Kansas and assist in building a Christian colony that mimicked New England 
values. The Company members genuinely cared about providing the best land possible for their 
settlers, because it was their mission to help these settlers improve their material possessions on 
Earth. When settlers wrote to inquire about where to settle, the Company continually responded 
the same way, by encouraging the settler to see the land before they bought it, so that they would 
not be disappointed or feel swindled.46 The settlers anticipated emigrating at a reduced rate, and 
having the Company take extensive care to provide them with grist and saw mills, a hotel, and 
other amenities that would assist in their settlement.  
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Although the NEEAC provided some inducements for settlers to move to Kansas, they also 
found it imperative that they not extend their giving into charity, but remain within the 
parameters of philanthropic giving. Webb reminded Nute:  
The importance of furnishing to our Kansas friends employment at fair wages as the best 
means of affording them relief. I doubt not that you will agree with me, that as a general rule 
the giving away outright is the bestowal of almost the very worst charity and in the long run 
would prove injurious to the settlements and ruinous to the recipients; in fact it would prove a 
premium for idleness; the trusty worth would be held back, and the most deserving, perhaps 
be overlooked.47  
 
The answer to helping settlers lay not in giving them money, but rather in giving them 
opportunities to improve their own condition through capitalism. Although the Company 
continued to have sympathy for settler families, especially those too proud to ask for money (a 
feeling that “could not be prevented”) the answer to building a New England in the West lay in 
the promotion of capitalism. 
The base of this conception of philanthropy remained rooted in a belief in New England 
superiority. The Company’s founders inherently believed that the Northern system of free labor 
was both morally and financially superior to the Southern slave power. Thomas H. Webb 
asserted that Northern emigrants would be “so strengthened in numbers, so well fortified in 
position, and so well provisioned, clothed, and munitioned” by New England philanthropy that 
“it would be worse than useless to attempt to impede the onward march of liberty, justice, and 
humanity.”48 Webb firmly believed that the power of Northern morals and practices would 
supersede the flawed viewpoint of Southerners, especially slaveholders. The problem with 
Southerners was not so much their own behaviors, but the negative influence of their politicians. 
Webb wrote that Missourians were “encouraged and led on by characterless, reckless, headless, 
                                                 
47
 Thomas Webb to Ephriam Nute, 1856, The New England Emigrant Aid Company Papers, 1854-1909.    
48




broken down politicians, and unprincipled, soulless, worthless partisans,” which left room for 
Northern morality to shape and change the minds of the common Southerner.49  
Similarly, the Kansas-Nebraska Act convinced New Englanders that the only way to win and 
tame the West was the transference of Northern morality. Webb wrote that it was “desirable that 
New England principles and New England influences should pervade the whole Territory” and, 
“no matter how heterogeneous the great living mass which flows in the territory may be, it will 
all eventually be molded into a symmetrical form, and the benefits resulting there from will be 
such that generations yet to come will bless the memory of those through whose efforts the boom 
of freedom, knowledge, and pure and undefiled religious were secured from them and their 
posterity.”50 By reimagining the West as a copy of New England, the NEEAC asserted their 
belief that their values and culture trumped all other societies. This idea inherently suggested that 
the West was a blank slate, ready to be molded by Northern ideals. Thayer wrote in a later 
history of the Company that, “its duty is to organize emigration to the West and bring it into a 
system.”51 As demonstrated in the next chapter, this idea of the West as a blank slate was 
undoubtedly false, and the practical settlement of the area could not follow this ideal that the 
Company once thought possible.   
To this end, the Company did not care whether or not the settlers actually exhibited the 
Northern qualities that they promoted. Even if emigrant families displayed no anti-slavery or 
republican values, Company officials believed that their New England roots intrinsically 
provided the morality needed to transform areas that they reasoned, had not been morally 
formed. Additionally, Thayer was convinced that principles of Northern morality and free labor 
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would convert any non-believers, even Southerners. Thayer wrote in 1858, after the Company 
had successfully settled various towns in Kansas that: 
I assert, on the best authority, that the majority of the inhabitants of Kansas, who 
went there from the slave states, are today Free State men. They came in contact 
with these Northern communities, they learned some facts for which they were 
not before cognizant, and they made up their minds that it was best for them and 
their children that Kansas should be a free state.52  
 
This idea was not just popular among Company men; it also captured the imagination of 
other New England moralists. In the early years of colonization, especially when the media 
heavily promoted the NEEAC’s Kansas ventures, other settlement groups imitated the 
Company’s model. While some colonization societies directly cited Thayer as their inspiration 
for domestic colonization and mimicked the NEEAC’s anti-slavery desire, others used this 
model to attack other signs of immorality. In both cases, the societies were attracted to Thayer’s 
idea of a colonization effort that encompassed northern ideals of morality and labor. 
Emigrant Aid Societies to benefit Kansas and supplement the work of the NEEAC 
popped up all over New England, often as unofficial local branches of the Company. Although 
the New York and Connecticut Emigration Societies both failed at the hands of, “self-seeking 
politicians,” their very existence signals that Thayer’s idea was both attractive and plausible in 
the Northern popular imagination.53 Though most branches proved unsuccessful, the Kentucky 
Kansas Association of Covington did succeed in colonizing Ashland, Kansas, with about sixty 
immigrants.  
After seeing the success of the NEEAC in Kansas, the Reverend John G. Fee wanted to 
establish a colony in Kentucky where, “anticaste, antislavery, and antisectarian education would 
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be taught.”54 Fee reasoned, “will not the same principles of action which prompted free-state 
men to go to Kansas exclude slavery, lead others to come to Kentucky to help abolish slavery?"55 
He eventually sought out Thayer on a speaking tour who promptly supported his endeavors as an 
extension of his plans to colonize Southern states.  
 The Company also placed particular importance on European immigration to Kansas, 
with the hope that they could siphon people out of the growing Eastern cities to move west. This 
was philanthropic because it gave a home to immigrants, but also continued the Company’s 
mission to make Kansas free. Eli Thayer corresponded with a company of Germans who had 
immigrated to Cincinnati under the guidance of A. Ostreicher. Ostreicher, who eventually did 
migrate to Kansas with one hundred people and the help of the company, wrote Thayer that, 
Although the majority of our members are germans by birth or descent, we all regret  and 
detest slavery as one of the more direful plagues of this our adopted country, and we are 
determined therefore, to exert all our influence, power, and means for the reduction of 
this great evil in general and especially for its exclusion, as far as possible, from Kansas 
territory.56  
 
 Ostericher’s ideas fit perfectly into the scheme of the NEEAC, and he also had further 
plans for his Germans in the territory. He offered Thayer their services in the creation of a 
German newspaper to recruit more settlers from his Native lands to Kansas. Frederick Olmstead, 
who had studied German settlements in Texas, wrote the company that this would be a wise 
investment because, “The great want of the Germans is capable to purchase the begging of a 
stock…Every German farmer worked gladly and faithfully.”57 The German publicity seemed to 
have worked, because by 1857, F.M. Serenbetz wrote the company after reading a circular 
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signed by an “agent of your Club for Germans.”58 When Serenbetz contacted the agent, he was 
told that so many Germans were responding, that it would be best to contact the Company 
directly. Upon learning that the town was of good Christian character, Serenbetz reveled to Hale 
that he was a Congregationalist minister, and that “to lay the foundation at a large Christian 
community among my countrymen, has long been a subject of deep anxiety with me, and I feel I 
have a mission to which under God’s blessing I hope to fulfill.”59 Serenbetz then set the 
conditions by which his colony would live, first and foremost of which was to “uphold the free 
institutions of this grand Republic which we have chosen as our adopted country.”60 The 
Germans planned on living communally for two years, then sell their shared equipment to 
individual families.  
 These successful companies of emigrants inspired the Company to send another pamphlet 
in 1858 to Germany and “confidently state that we are making preliminary arrangements to 
direct a large emigration of Germans from their Father Land to Kansas.”61 At this point mention 
of Germans drops off in the Company letters, and it is unclear how many more came to Kansas 
with the Company.  
 The Company also looked into removing orphans from New York to the territory. 
Foreshadowing the orphan train movement of the late nineteenth century, the New York 
Children’s Aid Society offered to “pay the expenses of the children there, and their board for a 
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few days in it in some suitable poor family and you if you are willing!”62 Again, there was no 
sign that the Company actually pursued this, but it does demonstrate the popularity of the 
NEEAC’s ideas to use emigration as population control.  
Although other colonies do not mention Thayer specifically as their inspiration, his 
model of domestic colonization for moral purposes became increasingly common. Some 
emigration companies, such as Henry S. Clubb’s Vegetarian Kansas Emigration Company, 
which began in 1855, used similar propaganda techniques and fundraising strategies. Clubb, like 
Thayer, championed the improvement of the moral fiber of American culture, but also economic 
enterprise. Clubb wrote that the colony would only accept “persons of good moral character,” 
and that the colony was “formed on the principles of freedom and morality as the surest 
foundations for the prosperity of the settlements and welfare of the country.”63 Clubb also 
viewed Kansas as an opportunity for financial gain, stating that the cooperative principle was 
adopted, “to promote, and not supersede, individual enterprise.”64 In 1854, Frederick Douglass 
proposed an emigration plan to Kansas, “by which one thousand free black families from 
northern cities would be resettled,” like the NEEAC, through the philanthropy of Northern 
donors.65 The wave of emigrant societies that cited Thayer directly for their inspiration and the 
independent societies that subscribed to his ideology indicates that his ideas fit into the popular 
imagination.  
The popularity of Thayer’s idea reflected the popularity of republican philanthropy. 
Rather than promoting a selfless philanthropy, the leaders and settlers of the NEEAC fully 
                                                 
62
 New York Children’s Aid Society to Edward Everett Hale, September 21, 1854, The New England Emigrant Aid 
Company Papers, 1854-1909.     
63Henry S. Clubb, “Constitution of the Vegetarian Kansas Emigration Company,” Reel #3984, Microfilm 
Collection, Western America Collection, Research Publications Inc, Connecticut.  
64
 Henry S. Clubb, “Constitution of the Vegetarian Kansas Emigration Company.”  
65
 David W. Blight, Frederick Douglass’ Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 48-9.  
  
30
expected to financially and morally gain from the colonization movement. The rise of the 
benevolent associations in antebellum America not only served the needy or sought to impose a 
vision of proper society, they also had the potential to serve their founders morally, financially, 
and politically. Even though the Company still accepted charitable donations from New England 
churchgoers, it was the modern philosophy of mixing morality and capitalism that carried the 
Company financially. But despite the popularity of philanthropic, domestic colonialism, the 
practical application of these ideas often blurred the lines of ideology. When the NEEAC 
actually unleashed its idea of philanthropy onto the American West, they soon realized that it 





Chapter Two: Settlement 
 
In 1813, as white Americans ventured westward and encroached upon Indian lands, 
Thomas Jefferson wrote to Alexander von Humboldt about his solution to the “Indian problem.” 
He wrote “the benevolent plan we were pursuing here for the happiness of the aboriginal 
inhabitants in our vicinities. We spared nothing to keep them at peace with one another. To teach 
them agriculture and the rudiments of the most necessary arts, and to encourage industry by 
establishing among them separate property.”1 As President, Jefferson supported assimilation for 
Native peoples, and many white Americans thought it only natural that Natives would prefer to 
forgo their “savagery” for civilization.2 Later in the letter, however, Jefferson revealed what 
would trample the ideology of assimilation and turn national Indian policy toward extinction—
problems in the West. He wrote, “they have seduced the greater part of the tribes within our 
neighborhood, to take up the hatchet against us, and the cruel massacres they have committed on 
the women and children of our frontiers taken by surprise, will oblige us now to pursue them to 
extermination, or drive them to new seats beyond our reach.”3 The language of the Natives as 
“seducers” constructed them as violent and manipulative, ready to pounce upon noble white 
farmers. In particular, he noted the danger of allowing Natives near women and children, whom 
it was the sworn duty of the masculine pioneer to protect.  
From the age of Jefferson to the bloody conflict of the Civil War, Americans thought that 
westward expansion held the key to the upkeep of democracy, and also the solution to growing 
problems of industrialization and sectional tension. By the 1850s, the Kansas territory in 
particular became a battleground of sectional tensions, exacerbated by the immigration of 
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thousands of white settlers. Congress organized the territory on May 30, 1854, and it extended 
more than six hundred miles west of the Missouri River. Although settlers of the NEEAC often 
viewed the territory as a blank slate ready to be molded by their institutions and values, it was far 
from an empty canvas in which white settlers could transplant their culture. 
The white settlers who immigrated to Kansas under the auspices of the NEEAC were not 
simply occupying and improving empty land, they were participating in a settler colonial 
enterprise. Daiva Stasiulis and Nira Yuval-Davis defined settler colonialism as a society in 
which, “Europeans have settled, where their descendants have remained politically dominant 
over indigenous peoples, and where heterogeneous society has developed in class, ethnic, and 
racial terms.”4 Settler colonial enterprises often form hierarchical relationships with Natives, 
focus on family migration to ensure the longevity of projects, and present their ventures as 
philanthropic or beneficial. This differs from extractive colonization, in which a mostly 
masculine colonizing force comes not to settle, but to control and appropriate resources.5 
Historian Margaret Jacobs argues that the difference between settler and extractive colonization 
should not “be seen as a strict dichotomy but as a continuum.”6 Over the course of the nineteenth 
century, the Kansas territory gradually transformed from a space of extractive colonization to 
one of settler colonialism, and the NEEAC was essential to the process. The white settlement of 
Kansas heavily depended on advertisement and propaganda to attract further settlement on this 
land. In the early nineteenth century the advertisements and pictures sent back East from Kansas 
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constructed the West as a masculine space fit for extractive colonization, but by the 1850s the 
NEEAC shifted the focus more toward the settler colonization of Indian lands with families. 
Historians of the antebellum conflict in Kansas tend to focus on the sectional conflict 
between Northerners and Southerners.7 Although understanding this tension is vital to a proper 
history of the Civil War, it can implicitly perpetuate the vacant land theory by ignoring Native 
removal, which occurred just a year before white settlement. Understanding Native removal in 
Kansas provides a unique lens with which to view the West’s role in the antebellum conflict and 
its relationship with the North. Examining the West as part of the sectional conflict and 
understanding the viewpoint of white settlers toward Native Americans helps construct a more 
complete analysis of Northern ideology before the war.  
 The NEEAC’s founders and settlers envisioned their settlement in Kansas as a benevolent 
enterprise that would only benefit the region. They sought to improve the “vacant” land with 
settler, family migration. Settlers and investors were working to discourage the spread of slavery, 
but they also believed that they were graciously and industriously imposing their vision of proper 
society on Western lands. In order to transform the Kansas territory from a space of dangerous 
settlement, only fit for masculine extractive colonization, to one that promoted family settler 
colonialism and thus Northeastern values, the NEEAC had to feminize and “pacify” the region.8 
As colonial theorists Ann Stoler and Carole McGranahan note, however, in this process colonists 
“create new subjects that must be relocated to be productive and exploitable, dispossessed to be 
modern, disciplined to be independent, converted to be human, stripped of old cultural bearings 
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to be citizens, coerced to be free.”9 The NEEAC’s aim to transform the West into a reflection of 
New England necessarily demanded a region free of “uncivilized” Native culture, to be obtained 
through either removal or assimilation.  
Through letters, published diaries, pictures, and newspapers, the NEEAC in many ways 
succeeded in promoting Kansas as a space suitable for family settlement. Like many other settler 
colonies, their prejudice was often “camouflaged under protestation of ‘pity’” for the fate of the 
Natives they dispossessed of land, but their pity did not halt their efforts to wrestle away the 
West.10 The Kansas territory was useful to Native peoples long before Eli Thayer decided it was 
suitable for Northerners. In order to examine the transformation sought by the NEEAC, we must 
first examine the territorial history of the Kansas Indians. 
In 1819, Major Stephen Long embarked on an exploratory mission to the Kansas territory 
in order to study and report on the Indians already present on the lands. Long depicted Kansas on 
his map as part of “the Great American Desert,” a name that Easterners would use to describe the 
plains for the next half century.11 This expedition was the first to bring along a professional 
artist, Samuel Seymour, to produce depictions of the west for a curious eastern audience.12 
Seymour produced 150 landscape views and perhaps the first white depiction of Kansas Indians. 
His depiction “War Dance in the Interior of a Konza Lodge” (Figure 1) shows an Indian 
ceremony inside a Native lodge. In the engraving, several Konzas men in war attire dance around 
a fire with weapons to the beat of a drum. Two white men watch on the left side, close to the 
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dancers, but not participating. A woman and child are shown leaving the ceremony, very clearly 
removed from the masculine space of the war dance.  
Seymour constructed the war dance, and thereby Kansas, as a masculine space. The 
Indians in the territory are the majority outnumbering the white men, and still powerful as they 
show their readiness for battle. Although white men are the casual observers of this dance, they 
seem to be viewing it as a spectacle, rather than a threat. The spectacle of Indian culture 
promoted and harkened back to Long’s claim that Kansas was part of a “Great American 
Desert,” wild and not fit for family settlement or colonization. Seymour indicates that Kansas is 
still an uncivilized masculine space full of barbarity and war.  
Seymour used his sketches as memory aids, and made his sixty paintings later upon his 
return to the East.13 The publishers of the official account of the exploration deemed this 
particular painting worthy enough to engrave and place in the published account. The article that 
accompanies the engraving tells the story of a band of Konzas who were at war with the 
Pawnees.14 The author described the evening: 
In the evening they retired to rest in the lodge set apart for their accommodation, when 
they were alarmed by a party of savages, rushing in armed with bows, arrows, and lances, 
shouting and yelling in a most frightful manner. The gentlemen of the party had 
immediate recourse to their arms, but observing that some squaws, who were in the 
lodge, appeared unmoved, they began to suspect that no molestation to them was 
intended. The Indians collected around the fire in the centre of the lodge, yelling 
incessantly; at length their howling assumed something of a measured tone, and they 
began to accompany their voices with a sort of drum and rattles….after dancing around 
the fire for some time, without appearing to notice the strangers, they departed…This 
ceremony [was] called the dog dance...15 
 
 In this account of “War Dance” women play a special role in signaling to the white 
settlers that no violence would come to them. The white explorers assumed that the Native 
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women culturally fulfilled the same domestic role that they did in American society. The author 
described the men, however, as “dogs” that participated in a primal war dance to entertain white 
explorers. In Seymour’s visual depiction, however, the women and children are leaving the 
dance, presumably because it is not their role to participate in the masculine war dance. The idea 
that the woman, the symbol of peace, was leaving the ceremony provides a more exciting 
narrative for the reader. Seymour’s decision to paint the women this way exoticized Indians and 
titillated curious audiences by depicting a violent male subculture. Because Seymour drew his 
painting based on a sketch and memory, he most likely based this picture on what he knew 
would get published in Boston. Therefore, Seymour’s illustrations reflected the popular 
Northeastern vision of the Kansas territory as a dangerous and uncivilized location.  
This same expedition hired professional artist Titan Ramsay Peale, whose art also 
appeared in the published exploration narrative. In this engraving (Figure 2), Peale shows three 
teepees, with a woman and child in the foreground. The teepees are in a vast open space, but still 
appear to have some qualities that a European American would notice as domestic. For example, 
each tent was set up in a way that afforded privacy with the cover of a door, but the tents were 
close enough together to be in a community. Peale placed the woman in the domestic sphere with 
her child. Like Seymour’s depiction, this engraving hints toward a lifestyle similar, but not equal 
to a white American one. The woman fulfilled the duty of raising children, but the “movable” 
nature of the home signaled toward a nomadic relationship to the land. This picture perpetuated 
the idea to Easterners that the West was vast, and that Native Americans were not fully utilizing 
the land by white standards. Finally, Peale’s depiction of a Native woman who was almost, but 
not quite, domestic by European standards signaled that missionary work could be successful in 
assimilating Indians into white culture. Peale and Seymour’s early illustrations of the Kansas 
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Territory reflected Northern views of the area as vacant but dangerous land only fit for extractive 
enterprise or missionary work. In order to promote the area for family settlement, the NEEAC 
would have to dispel rumors both of the aridity of the land and the character of the locals. 
Aside from the tribes already living in the Kansas territory that Peale and Seymour 
described in 1819, many more soon flooded the region. Between 1820 and 1860, the U.S. 
government ‘forcefully encouraged’ thousands of Native Americans from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Missouri to move to eastern Kansas.16 In exchange for annuities and 
agricultural tools, the tribes native to Kansas ceded thousands of acres to the emigrating Eastern 
tribes.17 More than ten thousand Kickapoos, Delawares, Sacs and Foxes, Shawnees, 
Potawatomis, Kansas, Ottawas, Wyandots, Miamis, Osages and various smaller tribes occupied 
the eastern part of the territory, where whites had promised they could live peacefully.18 From 
the Shawnee Treaty of 1825 to the Sac and Fox Treaty of 1843, the eastern Native tribes 
understood Kansas as the end of their struggle, but it was only the beginning. In March 1853, a 
bill in Congress authorized the president, “to enter into negotiations with Indian tribes west of 
the states of Missouri and Iowa...for the purpose of extinguishing the title of said Indians in 
whole or in part to said lands.”19 When the territory opened in 1854 to white settlement, the 
United States was in the process of what historian Paul Wallace Gates called, “one of the most 
complex and confusing arrays of policies affecting the distribution of public lands and the 
transfer of white ownership of Indian land-rights that have emerged in the continental United 
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States.”20 In other words, the government opened an area to white settlement that it technically 
did not own. With the floodgates open to white expansion, the messy process of removing the 
Kansas tribes to Oklahoma and Arkansas began, as did the process of settler colonization that 
usurped previous notions of the region as a masculine space of extractive colonization. 
When the Kansas-Nebraska Act further exacerbated the immigration movement to 
Kansas in 1854, the NEEAC sent thousands of New Englanders to a land to which they had no 
legal claim. A central concern for the NEEAC and its clients was learning from the federal 
government when the reservation land, particularly of the Shawnee, would be open to 
preemption. Preemption was a process by which, “It is expected that every settler will occupy his 
claim, and within a reasonable time (no fixed period) erect a building, that being the best 
evidence of his intention permanently to locate.”21 The Indians would allegedly get to choose 
which lands they wanted to keep, but many settlers preempted without consulting treaty 
agreements. Thomas H. Webb figured in 1856 that, it would “not be before Mid-summer, or Fall, 
inasmuch as the Survey is not yet complete, and the Indians have three months after the approval 
of the Survey, in which to make their selections.”22 Numerous potential settlers wrote to Webb 
requesting information about preemption of Indian lands, a clear signal that white Northerners 
understood that Natives had possession of the best lands and that they would be ignoring Native 
preferences.23 Webb informed a potential settler that the Delaware Trust lands, which that 
government pledged to “dispose of” for the “benefit of the Delawares” were of a “very superior 
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quality.”24 Indian land was known as, “some of the richest and most desirable tracts to be found 
in that region.”25 Charles Robinson, though without the money to purchase it himself, pushed the 
company to purchase the Wyandotte reserve lands in order that, “some arrangement may be 
made, mutually advantageous to the proprietors and to the Co. whereby one of the mills owned 
by the latter may be located on the land of the former, or in the vicinity.”26 Just two weeks later, 
the Executive Committee decided to sell one of their large mills to S.N. Simpson, who started a 
town in the Wyandotte Reserve.27 
Webb boasted that the lands would be valuable, “the moment they come under 
cultivation, and any man possessed of northeastern energy, enterprise, and industry who may 
invest funds in those lands cannot be otherwise than opulent thereby, in a very few years.”28 
Because of the NEEAC’s republican emphasis on capitalistic improvement, they put a higher 
value on the improvement of the land by white settlers, diminishing the Native hold on the land 
by arguing that they had not cultivated it properly.  
In order to entice settlers to come to a land previously described as fraught with danger, 
the Company became acutely aware of the importance of media in their venture.29 Even more so, 
the Company knew the importance of controlling the media. They knew that if their venture 
appeared favorable to those living in Northern cities, they would get more stock subscriptions, 
donations, and settlers. To this end, the company provided a loan to George Washington Brown, 
who became the editor of the NEEAC approved paper, The Herald of Freedom. Brown wrote to 
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his first wife and cousin Mrs. Walker, that he wanted to, “appeal to the people of the free North 
to rally around me, and together we would beat back the incoming tide of slave holders and their 
human chattels, and rededicate its sacred soil to freedom.”30 After reading a New York Tribune 
article outlining Thayer’s plan for colonization, he wrote Thayer begging for the Company’s 
blessing. Brown immediately had competition from Miller and Elliot of the Kansas Free State 
and John & Co. Speer of the Tribune. The competition was so fierce that Brown even accused 
his competitors of backdating their papers by seven days, “to deceive by appearance, and make 
theirs appear earlier than mine to those who knew nothing of the facts.”31 The rush among these 
New Englanders to establish the first press in Kansas signaled an intense awareness of both the 
growing importance of Kansas politics, but also the importance of advertisement.  
The Herald of Freedom became an unofficial arm of the NEEAC in a mutually beneficial 
arrangement. The NEEAC provided and promoted subscriptions, and Brown got seed money. 
Brown’s mission aligned closely with that of the NEEAC: 
It is not any intention to engage in a slavery discussion—my purpose being to furnish our 
certain friends facts and figures, as I see and can learn them, touching Kansas. As the 
country is desirable I think there will be a heavy emigration.32 
 
Like the NEEAC, Brown did not want to engage in politicking, rather, he preferred to 
promote immigration and development. In the early years of the paper, before the violent 
excitement of Bleeding Kansas bankrolled The Herald of Freedom, Brown sought even more 
assistance from the people of New England who he believed “promise more than [they] 
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perform.”33 The NEEAC found the paper essential to their publicizing mission. Thomas H. Webb 
wrote to Samuel C. Pomeroy in 1854, “and so important the Trustees consider it, to rightly and 
directly control that paper” that they would donate two thousand dollars on top of what they had 
already given.34  
 Brown’s editorials in The Herald of Freedom perpetuated the idea that the “Indian 
problem” in Kansas was resolved, promoting opening the area to further migration. One author 
wrote Brown, “Emigrants need be under no apprehension of personal injury from a village or 
large body of Indians. Among them, honor, morality, and religion have a preponderance over 
vice and crime.”35 Aside from publishing these assurances, Brown also provided a guide to the 
best lands to highlight, “the importance of the extinguishment of the Indian title to all the 
lands…The interests of Kansas demand that they should take active steps to reclaim this vast 
Territory from the control of the Indians, and deliver it into the hands of the white man, who will 
cultivate it, improve it, and make it subservient to the genteel prosperity of our country.” Brown 
listed tribal lands in order of importance, Delaware for their “unsurpassed” access to water and 
natural resources, Pottawatomie half of whom were “nearly civilized” and the other “wild and 
savage,” then Kickapoo, Sac and Fox, and New York in order of land size.36 Brown continued to 
publically support the work of the NEEAC and further their goals by propagandizing to Northern 
audiences. 
In their other media ventures, The NEEAC simultaneously presented Natives as a 
disappearing race and in need of Christian salvation. A pamphlet produced by the NEEAC that 
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sought to attract colonists by propagandizing Kansas contained various references to Indians as 
“half breeds” and “a shiftless and thriftless race of beings.”37 The pamphlet oscillated between 
proving that the Indians in the area were “friendly” with “minds above the ordinary stump” and 
that, “they must be brought under the influence of civilization and Christianity, or they’ll 
continue to melt away, until nothing remain of them.”38 While the NEEAC promoted emigration 
to prevent the spread of slavery, it also hastened the cultural disappearance of “hideous” 
Natives.39 Although the NEEAC appeared to have at least some sympathy for the Natives and 
wrote that they “might wish the fate of the Indian to be different,” they quickly added that it was 
“irrevocable...We may not wish to have them blotted out from among the peoples, but it is 
unavoidable.”40 Another pamphlet produced by the company deemed Kansas a “garden of Eden” 
that was “about to be re-occupied by the descendants of Adam.”41 This not only asserted that the 
Indian people were outside of the creation of God, it also promoted assimilation policies to 
diminish non-white bloodlines.42 These ideas illustrate the concerns of the settlers from New 
England, who at least feigned concern over the plight of the Indians, but overall sought to shape 
and “improve” both the land and its occupants. 
Settlers promoted this idea not only in their writing, but also with physical objects. For 
example, Figure 3 shows several different currencies of “The City Bank” of Leavenworth City. 
Printed in 1856, the dollars demonstrated their value not only with a standard number, but also 
with images of a man reaping wheat with a small cabin behind him.43 (One man reaping on the 
one-dollar bill, two on the two bill, and so on.) These images confirmed the white settlers’ 
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valued in coming to Kansas. The dollar showed improvement of the land with physical 
structures, unlike the temporary homes of Natives, and the possibility of successfully farming 
crops. It also illustrated the construction of a domestic space, further promoting Kansas as a 
realm in which men could bring their families and provide for them. 
Despite the focus of white settlers on the cultural erasure and removal of Natives, some 
NEEAC founders understood that their relationships in the West depended on a philanthropic 
reciprocity. The so called humanitarian act of “civilizing” the Natives and paternalistically taking 
Native lands came with an expectation that they would mutually benefit. White settlers did not 
expect Natives to disappear right away, but rather sought to integrate useful aspects of their 
culture into the new white settlements. Thomas Webb, for example, argued to Amos A. 
Lawrence that towns in Kansas should retain their Indian names. He wrote, “I have a great 
desire, as far as practicable, to retain Indian names, when euphonious and expressive.”44 By 
wanting to keep the Indian names for cities, Webb acknowledged the presence of Natives and 
their cultural erasure by the current practice of naming of towns after white men like Amos 
Lawrence. Webb also reasoned that Natives, “seldom select a name unless there be a significance 
in it.”45 Keeping Indian names for towns presented them as exotic to those in the Northeast, 
perhaps enticing settlement.  
In rare cases, white settlers were able to forge alliances with Kansas Indians, but these 
friendships often resulted in Indians ceding their land to settlers. One instance of interracial 
marriage occurred between Abelard Guthrie and Quindaro Nancy Brown, a Wyandotte woman. 
Because of his ties to both societies, Guthrie worked as a clerk and aided in the treaty that 
removed the Wyandotte from Ohio.  He also obtained a special arbitration role in the Kansas 
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land disputes of the 1850s. Figure 4 shows a contract between the Wyandott Commissioners and 
a man named Solomon Kayrahoo providing him ninety acres of land. In the left corner of the 
contract, there is a drawing of two Native men in front of a teepee. One is standing shirtless and 
in a headpiece, while the other kneels before him in full Native attire, reaching out his hand. 
Both men are staring into the words of the contract, casually holding their bows and arrows.46 In 
a treaty allotting land from Wyandotte claims, the choice to paint a Native American on a land 
contract acknowledges the original ownership of the land, but also Native passivity in letting the 
land go. Unlike the open space depicted by Peale, the NEEAC sought to confine their colonial 
subjects onto parceled out pieces of land, or send them further west.    
Webb, in particular, understood that white settlers could not only gain from Indian lands, 
but also from their trade. In 1857, a potential settler referred to as Mrs. C.J. Nichols wrote Webb 
asking why the white settlers in the area were not doing more to take advantage of Native trade. 
Webb responded that he had “often called attention to the subject of the value and extent of the 
Indian trade, but do not think our Kansas friends, and those who propose moving to the Territory 
are sufficiently impressed with its importance.”47 Webb clearly could gain little traction among 
members of the NEEAC to promote peaceful interactions with Natives, who saw them more in 
terms of removal and assimilation than cooperation. 
Aside from formal media promotion, many people, particularly women, wrote home. 
Their letters mirrored the dual economic and moral goals of the company, while simultaneously 
maintaining myths about empty land and the inevitability of Native extinction. Sara Robinson, 
the wife of Charles Robinson, who moved to Kansas in the first NEEAC party, wrote an essential 
promotional piece titled, Kansas: Its Interior and Exterior Life, to send back to Boston. She 
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wrote that before leaving Boston, she harkened back to her childhood understanding of the 
territory as the “Great American Desert, inhabited only by savages and wild beasts.”48 Her work 
then showed Kansas as cultivated and like New England. Robinson depicted the land nearly 
always in contrast to New England and noted the possibility of transforming the land to match 
“dear New England” “where art and taste had labored long.”49 For Robinson, it was natural that 
emigration would “flow into Kansas from the North and East” because “this Eden of America” 
held the promise of self-improvement and also the opportunity to civilize the region with 
Christianity.50  
 Like many settlers, Robinson saw her mission not just to improve the land, but also to 
benevolently improve the local people. In one story, Robinson met Dr. Barker and his family, 
who she immediately knew to be Easterners. “One glance at the room” she wrote, was sufficient 
evidence of this, because “books, pamphlets, pictures, vases, &c., were on all the tables, walls, 
and everywhere.”51 Satisfied by these symbols of civility, Robinson went on to praise the 
Barkers, who “worked indefatigably for the best good of the Shawnees.”52 She further lauded his 
paternalistic care of two Indian girls and a former slave, whom he had freed. Although media on 
Kansas had previously constructed it as a dangerous masculine space, Robinson’s account served 
to feminize it and promote family migration. In her account, even the most “savage” (Indians) or 
“backwards” (former slaves) could be brought into the white nuclear family and tamed into a 
picture of Northeastern civility.    
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In Robinson’s account, the only true threat to the creation of another New England was 
Southerners. She showed Northeastern readers the danger of not winning Kansas with the stories 
of mysteriously devious southern characters, one of whom even “said Stephen A. Douglas was a 
better man than Jesus Christ, made his appearance with his friends, and used every effort to 
break up the New England settlement.”53 Robinson’s industrious Northeastern workers prevailed, 
however, “proceeded with their improvements, erecting a saw-mill, boarding-houses, and 
stores.”54 Through improvement, Robinson believed that Kansas could also tame undesirable 
whites.  
Robinson’s view of the Indians illustrated to her audience the hierarchies of civilization 
in the territory. While she declared that the Kaws were “the most uncultivated of all” she praised 
the Shawnees for making “good advances in civilization” because “they have houses, cultivate 
their lands, and wear the dress of Americans.55 She also approved of the Delaware, who she saw 
“daily in our streets” “with their gay dress, half-civilized, retaining always the Indian blanket.”56 
She maintained that other, “less civilized” tribes pitched their tents further away from town, only 
coming for supplies, thus affirming that the only Natives that a family would encounter would 
already be assimilated to white culture. As for the “less civilized” tribes, Robinson depicted them 
as in need of benevolent, civilizing missions. She was especially critical of Native women and 
their childcare, writing about infants, “the poor little human, too, is encased in a red flannel bag, 
and carried on the back of the mothers.”57 Once again, Robinson promoted the need for white 
settlement in Kansas, not just because the land would offer opportunities for self-improvement, 
but also because it would result in Indian assimilation to white culture.  
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Proving that religion pervaded the region, especially among Natives, was an essential 
point in demonstrating to white readers that benevolent philanthropic enterprises were civilizing 
the region’s inhabitants. Robinson’s depiction of a Native American church service particularly 
demonstrated the effect of Christianity when she, 
Attended the little white church upon the rolling prairie today. Standing as it does upon 
quite an elevation, overlooking a great extent of woodland and prairie, being built with 
spire pointing heavenward, it reminds one of dear New England, and her pleasant villages 
scattered through all her valleys and upon all her hillsides. Being early, I noticed the 
Indian worshippers. Many of the men seated themselves in little groups upon the grass, 
and entertained each other in their odd-sounding dialect. The women came upon 
horseback, and, after tying their horses to the fence near by, came into the church, and 
maintained most strict decorum throughout the entire service. With the exception of the 
handkerchief upon their heads, in place of bonnet, their style of dress differed in no way 
from our own. They admire rich materials, and gay colors, and the most of those I saw at 
church were clad in chameleon silks. The service, although we could understand only an 
occasional word, was very impressive. The speakers, especially the interpreters, had rich 
mellow voices. Their quick and varied intonations, their rapid mode of enunciation, their 
graceful and most expressive gestures, singularly enchain the attention of the hearers, and 
impress upon them the substance of the discourse.58 
 
Robinson was careful to present the service as a slightly different version of a typical 
New England gathering. From the physical description of the church, to the attire of the Native 
women, Robinson’s account demonstrated to New Englanders that settlement had resulted in the 
assimilation and conversion of the Natives. Even though Robinson could not understand the 
Native language, she approved of their tone, especially of the most assimilated speakers, the 
interpreters. Other Christians also wrote home with similar tales. Reverand W.D. Haley 
reminded readers of the desirability of introducing Christianity “at an early day in the settlement 
of the territory.”59 He continued with a call to action, promising that he would personally “spend 
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two months out of the year in Kansas preaching whenever and I am fit a hearing week day and 
Sunday; and establish churches.”60  
These accounts sent back to the Northeast served several purposes. It helped transform an 
“unsettled” territory in the minds of readers from a masculine space to one that promoted the 
settler colonization of family migration. Accounts like Robinson’s were essential media arms of 
the NEEAC’s philanthropic mission because they dispelled notions that the West was dangerous. 
Robinson’s depicted the West as a more open version of New England, where whites had tamed 
“uncivilized” factions of society. She presented the West as an inviting place, with the threat of 
Natives diminished by philanthropic benevolence. Accounts such as Robinson’s portrayed 
Kansas as both an economic opportunity, depicting the environment as a land of milk and honey 
full of “soil for richness that can be surpassed in no country,” but also as a just religious 
movement that would “bring the civilization” to the land and sow “the seeds of harmony and 
good-will.”61  
Julia P. Lovejoy, a devout Methodist, exhibited a similar duality in her diary about the 
reasons her family moved to Kansas with the NEEAC. She wrote “every New England heart 
throbs for freedom” and “therefore we are glad we can labor for God and freedom here, where 
sin abounds…must be redeemed and saved, and we want a hand in helping on the good work.”62 
In addition to her religious goals, Lovejoy found herself pleased with the beauty of the land and 
the fact that “a man can build himself a comfortable residence, by doing the work himself, for 
$150 or $200, without plastering.”63 Like Eli Thayer and Sara Robinson, Lovejoy demonstrated 
new constructions of family migration justified for both religious and economic reasons. William 
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Goodnow, whose brother Isaac moved to Kansas via the enticements of the NEEAC, also 
espoused this idea, and pegged the chief benefit of moving that it “would place you in a 
condition to be above want & care which is now the chief burden of your life.”64 Settlers clearly 
understood the NEEAC’s plan as not only a less expensive option for emigrating to the West but 
also as an opportunity to spread their religious morality and principles of free labor to a “less 
civilized” area. 
Thomas Webb confirmed the importance to the NEEAC that women and families 
accompany men into the region. Family migration would not only be more permanent thus 
giving the enterprise validity, it would promote philanthropic benevolence because women were 
essential to the creation of a moral settlement. Webb wrote that the women who settled New 
England were “of the true New England stamp, who will impact a high moral tone to the 
settlement, and be sure to train up the rising generation in the way they should go.”65 By moving 
West, Webb also thought that women would become powerful pioneers once liberated from the 
confines of urban, genteel living. The NEEAC continuously clamored for the women of their 
parties to send back, “sketches of Interior life” because they “are capable of affecting an infinite 
deal of good this way by means of the pen.”66 Even more importantly, the NEEAC believed that 
women were the key to maintaining settlement in Kansas. Webb wrote:  
We need communication of strong minded, [sic] women, to put to shame if possible the 
weak-minded, fainthearted men, who having mistaken their calling, and finding 
themselves unfit for pioneers, return whence they came, and flood the papers with 
dolorous accounts of what they saw and what they could not find in the new territory. 
One of this capable minded …has given the public the results of his short-lived expensive 
in a letter nominally addressed to men, tho’ neither the original nor a printed copy has 
ever been furnished me. He sounds the alarm, and may excite the fears of some who have 
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relatives and friends in Kansas, by declaring that those who remain through the winter 
will see sufferings almost beyond description before Spring.67  
 
 Female emigrants to Kansas took on an essential role in the NEEAC’s mission because 
they had an ability to keep men in the West and ensure that they would achieve settlement. Webb 
believed that women hold the moral fiber and strong minds necessary to settle the West, which 
would provide the moral instruction necessary to perpetuate the longevity of the colony. 
Part of presenting Kansas as a territory open to family settlement also included ensuring 
the exclusion of free blacks. Even though the NEEAC considered itself anti-slavery, they were 
by no means abolitionists. In fact, Eli Thayer was a staunch anti-abolitionist, which at the time 
was a more popular and socially acceptable than abolitionism.68 In the West, discrimination 
against freed slaves reached its height between 1846 and 1860, precisely the moment when the 
prohibition of slavery was most hotly debated.69 Although members of the NEEAC generally 
promoted anti-slavery, they did not necessarily want to have a large population of freed slaves in 
their territory. There was even a faction of anti-slavery, anti-black settlers who saw in the 
movement the chance to exclude “all freed slaves from Kansas.”70 Although settlers with the 
NEEAC saw themselves engaged in a moral struggle against slavery, they had no real desire for 
racial equality. Thayer himself wrote that some of his emigrants’ motivations were tinged with a 
certain distaste for African Americans whom he claimed settlers had very “little pity for.”71 One 
settler named T. H. Cunningham wrote the company, “As a great will I detest slavery, but what 
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will you do with the Kansas slave if it is abolished? They can't hold there own and if given a fair 
land would ruin it and relapse into African barbarism. I have the same kind of antipathy although 
not to great degree, to a black man or woman that I have to a monkey.”72  Although Thayer was a 
bit more understanding of anti-slavery, he openly scoffed at the abolitionist cause and noted, “the 
best and more trustworthy emigrants in the cause of free Kansas…hated slavery as much as any 
one, but they had not exhausted their strength in deploring the ‘great sin of slavery.’”73 In fact, 
Thayer admonished the abolitionists who came to Kansas with his company saying that they 
“wasted all their energies in sighing and weeping for the ‘poor slave,’” and on future trips 
advised these “tearful specimens to stay at home.”74 Two abolitionist settlers from an NEEAC 
company confirmed this attitude when they wrote home. One said that he was “much 
disappointed in the character of the emigrants here” and another wrote that most in his company 
were “not remarkably strong abolitionists.”75 Thayer himself never sought provisions for the 
inclusion of freed slaves, and the sheer absence of their mention in the literature of the NEEAC 
suggested the desire to create a model society that would not require civil rights. The Topeka 
Constitutional convention on October 23, 1855, which NEEAC leaders like Charles Robinson 
attended, confirmed this belief when they added a “negro exclusion” clause to the Constitution. 
Anti-slavery Kansans approved the Constitution 1,731 votes to 46 and the “Negro provision” 
1,287 to 453.76 Although the government took no actual steps toward this end, the exclusion 
clause demonstrated the seemingly paradoxical opinions of the settlers regarding African 
Americans. 
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After 1856, the Kansas Territory became a battleground for the coming Civil War and the 
complex Indian treaty processes faded into the background. While earlier land grants had 
acknowledged the presence of Native peoples, by 1859 official papers promoted the success of 
white settlement. Figure 5 shows a land claim debt for James G. Emory. It had been only four 
years since the Wyandotte claim paper, and yet it showed pictures of industrialization—a train 
billowing past a picturesque countryside and a large, developed building. It some ways, this 
change signaled that white colonists believed that their project was complete. These later land 
claim papers presented Kansas as a white space, fit for families and further migration. Just like 
the NEEAC settler who worried that the Indians would “melt away,” the white settlement of 
Kansas had erased their connection to the Natives.  From its foundations as the “Great American 
Desert” which constructed the West and Kansas as a masculine space of conquest to the 
beginning of the Civil War, Kansas increasingly moved from a space of extractive colonization 
to one of settler colonialism. The erasure of Indians and exclusion of free African Americans 
from documents and illustrations was essential to the process of constructing Kansas as mirror of 
Eastern civilization.  
In a letter to Thayer, Theodore Park summarized how many New Englanders felt about 
minority groups: “It seems to me you have hit the nail on the head; for we can’t prevent the 
spread of an industrious, thoughtful, and enterprising people into the domains of an idle, 
heedless, and unprogressive people, but can prevent the fitting out of hordes of pirate. We can 
organize emigration, and send men to the barbarous country who will do much service to 
themselves, to it, and to us.”77 The NEEAC immigration to Kansas was a settler colonial 
enterprise meant to “improve” the land and the locals, while excluding “undesirables.” The 
Company promoted family migration to Kansas through advertisements and propaganda in order 
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to mold Kansas into a reflection of New England, which led to exclusion of free blacks and 
Indian removal. Soon, these undesirables that needed benevolent Northern conquering would not 






















































Figure 1: “War Dance in the Interior of a Konza Lodge” by Samuel Seymour. 





Figure 3: Banknote from Leavenworth City, 
1856. Kansas State Historical Society. 3  
Figure 4: Wyandott contract. Kansas State 
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Chapter Three: Beyond Kansas 
 In 1861, Eli Thayer wrote two letters to President Abraham d to outline his plan for a 
“cheaper & safer method” to save the Union.1  He suggested that the Government “enforce a 
homestead” to encourage “planting…in sufficient numbers colonies of loyal men from the North 
& from Europe” into rebellious states.2 Thayer suggested Virginia and Texas as viable options, 
but reasoned that it would work well in any Southern state. Although Thayer was convinced that 
this would secure “the perpetual loyalty of the Southern States,” Lincoln never answered.3  
 One year later, Brimmer M. Hook wrote to Edward Everett Hale that he had seen Eli 
Thayer the day before. Thayer had not given up on this plan, and imparted unto him a “scheme 
for establishing a ‘colonization department’ of the government,” which would offer “free 
passage to free immigrants to the South from all parts of the civilized world.”4 Hook viewed the 
idea with suspicion, noting that Thayer was even “finer and grandiose” than before.5 Thayer and 
what remained of the NEEAC after Kansas, continued to spread the company’s mission of free 
labor ideology, which they believed would not only civilize the West, but also the South. In the 
antebellum period, they presented their immigration plans as a solution to sectional conflict, and 
in the postbellum period, as an avenue for Reconstruction. 
Histories that examine the New England Emigrant Aid Company rarely follow them past 
Kansas, after the violence of the border wars and the coming of the Civil War. By this point, 
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many historians dismiss the Company as having completed its most important task, and indeed, 
Kansas remains the only real example of Company success. The Company did not officially 
close its doors until the twentieth century, and in that time became involved in several other 
emigration projects. The NEEAC continued to believe, just as they had in Kansas, that “there is 
no earthly reason why anybody should give their money out of philanthropy.6 The thing must 
come upon a business basis or it goes under, and the business basis is this. Show men how they 
can get a handsome return for their money and they will put it in. If you cannot show them that 
you cannot get the money.”7 The Company continued to mix the tenets of capitalism with the 
mission of Christian morality as a solution to poverty and sectionalism. Even after the Civil War, 
they continued to promote the type of nineteenth century philanthropy that Eli Thayer had so 
effectively advocated in the 1850s, which not only assisted in emigration schemes, but also 
benefitted the stockholders and Directors. As the century drew to a close, however, these plans 
started to look more and more like the land speculations that the Company had vehemently 
denied as their mission earlier in Kansas and despite similar ideology, their attempts to colonize 
western Virginia, Texas, Florida, and Oregon failed quickly because oflack of funding and 
support. Company secretary F.B. Forbush attributed this failure to the lack of “absorbing public 
interest” in comparison to Kansas. And indeed, popular opinion had shifted to favor immediate 
solutions, such as war to gradual solutions like immigration.8   
In 1857, during the height of the NEEAC’s success and fame in the Kansas Territory, the 
Company began to redirect its ideology to the colonization of West Texas. This idea, which 
eventual company agent Frederick Law Olmstead (who would later become famous as the 
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landscape architect of Central Park), wrote to Edward Everett Hale that, “last week he saw some 
men from Kansas who said it was a common thing for the more zealous fighting free settlers 
there to talk of taking western Texas next. I have a constantly improving conviction there that is 
the thing we do next that it can be done easily.”9 The idea of colonizing Texas had long been on 
the minds of the Company directors as a viable next step in the process of spreading Republican 
ideals. Hale posited an idea to colonize the region as a means to end slavery in his 1845 
pamphlet “How to Conquer Texas before Texas Conquers Us.” Although Hale claimed this work 
as the direct inspiration for the NEEAC, Thayer believed he came to it by divine intervention.10 
In either case, this work by Hale argued that Texas could be saved from the evil of slavery if “the 
north pour down its hordes upon these fertile valleys, and bear civilization, Christianity and 
freedom” to “continue there the contest of freedom, in the first skirmish of which we had been 
defeated.”11 He wrote that the immigration plan was “not wild nor Utopian,” and would not 
require “any spasmodic exertion, any self-sacrifice, any crusading spirit,” because Northern 
capitalists would fund the venture.12 Hale argued that “such an effort to introduce free labor and 
free institutions on the virgin soil of a new republic, must command the sympathy of freeman 
and Christians the world over,” and that God would reward the settlers with the “blessing of 
Providence,” which would in turn render them economically successful.13 Considering Hale’s 
plan to “conquer” Texas, it was no wonder that he so eagerly assisted Thayer in Kansas and 
became a staple member of the NEEAC’s projects in other regions.  
        Thayer also had larger plans for the Company from its conception. He wrote that the goal of 
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the association was for it to “grow and expand till it shall become the cloud by day and the pillar 
of fire by night to the lovers of Freedom all over the Earth. Its first aim is to secure Kansas and 
Nebraska as Free States. But when these are redeemed from the perils that now encompass them, 
the Society will advance up on objects of even a wider scope.”14 Thayer believed that once the 
Kansas project proved successful, the principles of religion and free labor would propel his 
business into a nation-wide affair.  
          The Company used Kansas as a springboard into this next venture, which true to their 
ideological roots, sought not only to increase the adherence to free labor, but also to provide 
large returns on investments for stockholders. Following up on the zealous Kansas settlers who 
wanted another adventure, the company sent pamphlet information to the territory, the “purpose 
being to encourage attention to Texas among the right sort of men and diffuse in formation about 
the country.”15  
Another piece of media that the Company circulated was Olmstead’s account of his trip 
to Texas in 1857, which served as a promotional piece, but also as a reminder of the Company’s 
goals in emigration. Olmstead adhered to the Northern Republican idea of philanthropy as a 
means to ending the oppression of slavery in the region. He outlined his opposition to slavery, 
not in humanitarian terms, as an abolitionist would, but in economic terms, which was more 
characteristic of anti-slavery Republicans. He wrote that a slave holding Texan would spend 
most of his money on buying slaves, whereas an Iowan could simply advertise and hire hands 
with his money. Not only was it cheaper to participate in free labor enterprise, he wrote that: 
The Iowan is able to contribute liberally to aid in the construction of the church, the 
school-house, the mill, and the railroad. His laborers, appreciating the value of the 
reputation they may acquire for honest, good judgment, skill and industry, do not need 
                                                 
14Thayer, The History of the New England Emigrant Aid Company, 28.  
15
 Frederick L. Olmstead to Edward Everett Hale, January 10 1857, The New England Emigrant Aid Company 
Papers, 1854-1909.     
  
60
constant superintendence, and he is able to call on his neighbors and advise, encourage 
and stimulate them. Thus the church, the school, and the railroad are soon in operation, 
and with them is brought rapidly into play other social machinery, which makes much 
luxury common and cheap to all.16  
 
Olmstead believed that slavery needed to be eliminated in Texas because it would make 
white industry more effective and lead to more productive society. In contrast to the uplifting 
Iowan, the Texas planter would, “have personally grown rich, perhaps; but few, if any, public 
advantages will have accrued from his expenditures.”17 Olmstead did not believe that making 
money was wrong; in fact, he believed it was noble and he also believed that the best way to 
have a productive society was through free labor.  
Olmstead also saw colonization as a way to repair the damage that slavery had already 
done in Texas. He wrote that the “extension of slavery into Texas, commenced, for good or evil, 
in our own day; and when we of the North had the power and the constitutional right to prevent 
it.”18 On his trip to Texas, he met various Northerners and showed how they were in great need 
of uplifting company, lest they fall prey to Southern ideology. One man he met: 
did have the wit to say he believed he should have been better off now if he had 
remained at the North. Think of the probabilities--the son of a master mechanic, with a 
considerable capital. Educate him where you please, in any country not subject to the 
influence of slavery, how different would have been his disposition, how much higher 
and more like those of a reasonable being, would have been his hopes, aims, and life.19 
 
To Olmstead, saving Northerners already in Texas was just as important as changing the 
quality of the region to conforming to Northern ideals. Like media efforts in Kansas, Olmstead 
also sought to show that Texas was an area safe for Northern immigration. Although he noted 
that Mexicans were treated “as vermin, to be exterminated,” and that slaves suffered under the 
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system of oppression, he often reminded his readers that the control of the state was firmly in the 
hands of whites.20 This was evident in his discussion of the “native savages” he encountered, 
where he noted that Indian agents had successfully “tamed” the indigenous residents through 
nothing other than capitalism. He wrote that by providing “a certain pension in clothing and 
food, for keeping quiet,” the Natives had learned to substitute the “use of the plough for that of 
the scalping-knife.”21  
He also proved that foreigners could easily adapt to the climate of Texas and endure the 
locals, by writing at length about the German settlements in the area. He wrote of their 
“experiment,” which used “associated capital” to transport emigrants on a large scale under a 
charter from the Duke of Nassau.22Although more than 2,000 families came to Texas under this 
agreement, in which each adult could pay $120 for free passage and forty acres of land, they 
became “humbugged by speculators” because ofpoor organization and ignorance.23 He wrote that 
despite German failures, which he attributed to “bungling and cruel mismanagement,”  “in the 
hands of men of sound sense and ability,” the project would “have ranked as, in the highest 
degree, a beneficent acquisition of experience, inaugurating almost a new era for humanity.”24 
Olmstead was careful to show his support of this immigration model, which he also saw as 
successful in Kansas. He wrote that the NEEAC project in Kansas, “served, at least, to show 
what might be realized, in calm times, by the power of organization of capital.”25 Olmstead’s 
work on Texas, coupled with his compatible northern ideology, brought him into almost 
immediate contact with the leaders of the NEEAC. His goals and views fit so well into the 
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mentality of the Company that he was hired almost immediately in May 1857 as their Texas 
agent, by recommendation of Colonel Daniel Ruggles of the United States Army.26 
After significant research into the region, board member Samuel Cabot, Jr., 
recommended a similar plan in West Texas—purchase the land at twelve to fifty cents an acre, 
introduce mills, churches, and schools, and through “the rise in value of land paying a handsome 
profit on the investment.”27 Once again, this land speculation had a Republican goal, and was 
seen as a philanthropic move, which could destroy slavery without a violent internal conflict. 
Cabot noted that the main purpose of the Texas adventure was to make “apparent on a large scale 
that free cotton can be raised and pay well for its production,” which would “show to the slave 
states that white labor not only can compete with slave labor, but vastly excel it, in the quantity 
and quality of the article produced” and “gradually induce the poor whites of the slave states to 
take up this kind of labor.”28 Northerners lauded this philanthropic capitalism as a “pure 
Christian duty,” and others even wrote the Company offering to sell their land at cheap prices.29 
There was also an effort to induce the settlement of Europeans, in particular Germans and 
British, to settle the region; apparently their anti-slavery sensibilities qualified them to pose as 
Northerners in this emigration scheme.30 Unfortunately for the NEEAC, the Panic of 1857 broke 
up the financial incentive for settlement, and effectively drained their accounts.31 The Company 
and its affiliates continued to discuss the matter of Texas even into March 1860. The Texan 
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Committee Report, written by Cabot, urged for “sooner measures” in securing Texas for 
freedom, but with the impending secession, it was simply too late.32  
 At the same time that the Company was considering West Texas as a possible venue, Eli 
Thayer also sought out Virginia out as an area for Northern emigration. Thayer began his own 
emigration company for this venture, called the Emigrant Homestead Association, but it 
effectively served as an arm of the NEEAC in Virginia. Thayer retrospectively wrote that when 
he created the Charter for the NEEAC, it “was my purpose…to be done with Kansas in 1855, 
and then, without loss of time, and with increased capital, to have bought up large tracts of worn-
out lands in Virginia.”33 Thayer further contended, “two years of such work, by such a company, 
in Virginia, would have made her as secure for the Union in 1861 as Massachusetts was.”34 In 
March 1857, Thayer enlisted the help of a Mr. Woodward and Mr. J. McKay to assist in drafting 
a bill for the charter of the new company. Once again, the Company was to be funded by stock 
subscriptions and would convince Southerners to amend their ways by example.35 Thayer 
attempted to use his same sources of funding for the project, once again calling on Amos A. 
Lawrence for subscription, despite the fact that Lawrence had dropped all affiliation with the 
NEEAC in September 1855 due to not receiving his promised compensation.36 Thayer wrote in 
The Liberator that his plan was thus: “I assure you it is our purpose to be strictly a business 
organization. We shall abide by the laws, state and national…We shall purchase large tracts of 
land at Slave State prices; shall give way to actual settlers about one-fourth; shall sell about one-
fourth, at cost, and the remainder at free state prices—thus probably doubling our money on the 
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speculation.”37Although the Company eventually successfully colonized the city of Ceredo, 
Virginia (now West Virginia), the biggest impact of Thayer’s side venture was the media 
controversy it sparked.38  
Thayer argued that his plan was so well incentivized Southerners would gladly join in 
and support the endeavor. He saw his plan not only as a way to eradicate slavery via the highly 
superior system of free labor, but also a way in which he could quell rising sectional tensions. He 
wrote that Southerners could have no reason for resisting his plan, but every reason to encourage 
it,” after all, he reasoned, “we do not come as your enemies; we come as your friends. We do not 
come to violate your laws, but to improve your own condition.”39 This assumption, tinged with 
the egotism of Northern moral and economic authority, certainly gained him notoriety among 
some southerners, but Thayer wrote that when he toured the South pitching his idea in 1857, he 
garnered wide southern support. He wrote, “Western Virginia has proffered a friendly 
welcome…Kentucky has presented the strongest inducements yet offered…we continue to hear 
from the progressive sons of North Carolina and Tennessee. Applications to go are as numerous 
as invitations to come.”40 He even claimed, “I can show you that even slaveholders are on our 
side, and that, too, in large numbers.”41 Thayer believed that even the slaveholder,  “could not 
withstand the progress of this age and the money making tendencies of the Yankee.”42 
Although Thayer’s claims of Southern support were certainly exaggerated, some 
Southerners did support his mission. The New Orleans Delta compared Thayer to General 
Gardenshire, who wanted to donate his land for skilled laborers to come from the North to 
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Missouri, stating that “Thayer is engaging in similar villainy in Virginia…but does not appear 
that he has met with the same opposition as Gardenshire encountered in Missouri.”43 According 
to this Southern newspaper, Virginians were more receptive to this plan (perhaps because ofthe 
Panic of 1857). One Virginian wrote to Thayer of his “dilapidated state” of Virginia: 
Her mountain water courses and her valleys want nothing but Northern enterprise and 
intelligence to make them a hundred fold more prolific in all the elements of material 
wealth and the highest Christian civilization. The school house and the church will follow 
the loom and the anvil—labor will become associated then, not as now, with color and 
caste, and mental and moral degradation—but with intelligence, refinement and moral 
progress.44 
 
These Southern accounts, though perhaps imagined or exaggerated by Northern 
newspapers, did manifest real argument over the utility of emigration enterprises. This debate 
even led to speculation about the Governor of Virginia, whose “extensive schemes for internal 
improvement” included “looking with favor upon Eli Thayer’s scheme of colonizing Western 
Virginia, and consecrating it to free labor.”45 This was a cause for the title of the article in the 
Chicago Daily Tribune, “Is Gov. Wise an Emancipationist?” and widespread Northern and 
Southern speculation on his actions. Northern support, especially among anti-slavery and 
abolitionists was readily apparent.  
Many Southerners were of course, not convinced of the project’s validity. In The South, a 
newspaper printed in Richmond, Virginia, an article called the project, “exactly identical with the 
original Kansas Emigrant Aid Society” and “a crusade against slavery—a propagation of Black 
Republicanism.”46 Further, it claimed that “it will open the way for the march of Black 
Republicanism towards the South, and will reduce us to the necessity of fighting the battle on our 
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own borders.”47 This article, reprinted in The Liberator for Northern consumption, emphasized 
the threat of colonizing the South. After the conflict of Bleeding Kansas just a few years before, 
there was no doubt that the introduction of what Thayer considered superior Northern labor was 
increasing sectional tensions.  
  Some Northerners disliked the plan’s focus on white labor and neglect of slavery. 
Essentially, the NEEAC was fighting against accusations of land speculation. The New York 
Herald dubbed this plan, “The Free White Recolonization of Virginia,” and proclaimed that the 
“waste landowners of Virginia have offered over five million acres of Eli Thayer, ‘as cheap as 
dirt,’ for cash” while he “boldly proclaims that free white labor, even to the utter exclusion of 
niggers.”48 For some Northerners, the South was quickly becoming irredeemable without 
conflict, and the propagation of white labor did not even come close to answering the problem.   
 A group of Freedmen did write Thayer in 1858 asking for advice and refuge. The author, 
J. C. Foster, wrote: 
Sir we the colored people of Western New York contemplate making an effort to relieve 
ourselves of these American Disabilities under which he suffer until (forbearance insisted 
to be a virtue). Sir the information we seek is that which we think you and complete from 
experience as any is the person in the US to give...Sir it cant be possible that this lost god, 
we’ve been taught is all powerful will allow such an injustice to us very much longer 
without his inter-cession…I thought the Constitution of the New England Emigrant Aid 
Society would meet our case precisely.49 
 
Foster, profusely asking Thayer to “excuse the letter both spelling and writing for I am 
self taught and what is bad if not worse I am Black,” also saw the potential for settlement under 
the Company name.50 There is no record that Thayer assisted these freed people in settling 
Virginia, but the emigration companies that he had started clearly began to draw support or 
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rejection from different factions of Americans, foreshadowing the divides of the Civil War. 
Some Southerners rejected his plan as pretentious and aggressive, while others (often in western 
Virginia) accepted the plan as a solution to their rising debt and misfortune. The rising 
population of staunch Northern abolitionists criticized it as a money making scheme for white 
people, while other Northerners lauded the plan as the perfect nonviolent solution to sectional 
tensions. African Americans saw the idea as a way to obtain land and live peacefully apart from 
oppression. All of these groups became essential to the politics of the Civil War, and Thayer’s 
project in Virginia sparked debate and conversations over slavery and Northern sectionalism.   
The idea of colonization as a benevolent enterprise was a longstanding tradition in 
America, tracing back to the American Colonization Society. Thayer also applied his domestic 
colonization, an iteration of such ideology, internationally to Central America. In an 1858 speech 
to Congress, Thayer advocated Republican ideology and immigration of Northern people as the 
solution to overpopulation. He maintained that an emigration movement, “in accordance with the 
highest laws, human and divine,” would “give us Central America as soon as we want it.”51 This 
would relieve the North of its excess population of foreign immigrants, noting that Kansas had 
already served as an effective “outlet.”52 Thayer definitively described this process as 
philanthropic, but also emphasized the immense and moral power that it would give emigration 
companies.  He told the Congressional Committee: 
the people of Central America were oppressed, that they needed our assistance, and that it was 
conferring a benefit upon them to send out colonies among them to aid them to get rid of their 
oppressors. This is more than patriotism. It approaches universal brotherhood…But in addition to 
that, just look at it, sir! In addition to that great argument of philanthropy, we have not only the 
argument of necessity, but the argument of making money; and when you take those three 
arguments, and combine them, you make a great motive power, which is sufficient, in ordinary 
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cases, to move Northern men, though they are not very mobile not very fickle.53  
 
The ultimate supporter of Republican and imperialistic philanthropy, Thayer also saw the 
potential benefit for himself as the leader of an emigration company. He bragged that if Congress 
were to approve such a company, the owners would become so powerful that they could afford 
to laugh at politicians, the Supreme Court, and even the President; the power of Government 
would eventually be unable to “in any way interfere with our progress or prevent our making 
cities and States and nations wherever and whenever we please.”54 White self-improvement, 
specifically that of Northerners (Thayer expressly stated that “Northern states are the only ones 
who can furnish emigration that would be of any consequence to Central America”), would not 
only benefit the United States but would replace the barbaric conquest of the past with a 
philanthropic one in which Americans could proudly lift up a broken region.55  
 The Civil War quickly halted any real success that the NEEAC could have potentially 
ahcieved in Texas, West Virginia, or Central America. The Company’s business was put on hold 
during the war, but commenced again during the postbellum Reconstruction period as a viable 
option for emigration. The Company was involved in sending women to Oregon in 1864 and its 
final scheme centered on reconstructing Florida in the 1880s. In both cases, the Company held 
essentially the same values as before the war, but deviated in small ways from their Republican 
ideology. In Oregon, the Company ventures most closely resembled charity; in Florida, the 
scheme’s manifestation looked more like land speculation or what a Southerner may classify as 
carpet bagging.  
 In 1864, Edward Everett Hale published a report on the possibility of sending women to 
Oregon. The company once again argued that women were the essential missing piece to the 
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colonization scheme. Feeling that only women could tame the mostly male population, they 
provided funds for “seamstresses, housemaids, teachers, and (possibly) matrimonial candidates” 
with the hope that they would “speedily better the condition” of the territory.56 Unlike the family 
migration the Company promoted in the antebellum period, this migration was primarily focused 
on young, single women.  
 Hale’s tract emphasized the need for the migration through census data. He reported that 
the 1860 census showed “in a population of 52,160, there were 19,961 males over 15 years of 
age, and only 9,878 women of the same age. The population is now estimated as considerably 
over 100,000; and the disproportion—more than two to one of males—has not probably changed 
at all.”57 He noted that this problem was evident in the comparatively high wages of women in 
Oregon, who, without competition, were making a dollar a day in gold, even if they were 
unskilled laborers.58 Hale concluded that the only way to organize “all of the best social 
influences in the civilizing of the State,” was to import women of “good character.”59 He wrote 
that it would also do New England good, because it would rid them of his calculated 29,166 
“surplus” women, and drive up wages for women in the North.60   
 Hale’s proposed plan involved sending Henry Higgins and his wife to Oregon as agents, 
so that they could discern the feasibility of this project. Then, the Company would provide the 
necessary protection needed for the journey, but the women would fund it themselves at a cost of 
three hundred dollars apiece. Unlike previous NEEAC endeavors, which promised the 
stockholders rewards, this enterprise insisted that the money, once paid, “should be used to 
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facilitate the emigration of other women, so long as this emigration may seem desirable.”61 Only 
nine days after Hale published his report, the Higginses were given their instructions, officially 
promoting them as agents of the Company for the next year. Higgins was required to “relieve the 
passage of its circumstances” for the women he brought, and take the women to San Francisco 
and then to Portland.62 Under his own discretion, he could loan the women “such money as you 
may think necessary for her to establish herself,” but that amount could not exceed one hundred 
and fifty dollars.63 Higgins was to protect and guide these women of good character to their 
homes in Oregon, but he almost immediately ran into trouble.  
After the Company’s first attempt to send a small group of women to Oregon, Higgins 
wrote the Company that he was “quite satisfied that sending out a few girls at a time and 
allowing them to mix with others on the passage, will never do. They must be sent here with 
large numbers and kept to themselves otherwise the object will be defeated.”64 Apparently, one 
of the single women he had taken with him, Jane J. Miller, had become a “fallen woman” and a 
“special favorite with the stewards.”65 Though Miller had apparently retorted that “she was 
capable of taking care of herself,” Higgins became worried that her actions “considerably 
influenced” the other women.66 Higgins did not consider this the fault of Miller, however, but 
rather chalked up the offense to the wily nature of Western men, who, far removed from 
Northern civilization, and the moral influence of women, had receded into barbarism. In many 
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ways, Higgins’s experiences only exacerbated the fears of the NEEAC, as it seemed to imply 
that the steady influence of women was desperately needed to immediately reform Oregon.  
 Higgins’s wife, a woman who was only mentioned as such, played a role in promoting 
this idea. Just the thought of Mrs. Higgins on the journey seemed to set her as a role model for 
the women already in Oregon. She was even authorized to write officially for Henry when he 
was disposed.67 In many letters concerning the couple, the authors were careful to mention that 
Higgins was a “woman of energy and enterprise.”68 She embodied exactly what the Company 
valued in women who would migrate to Oregon; she was “energetic,” which was necessary for a 
long pioneer journey and “intelligent,” which would help her improve the character of settlers.69 
Her only flaw was her Australian heritage, but it was stated that she possessed “better education 
than you expect of an Australian.”70  
 In order to obtain enough women for the project, Hale suggested that the Company could 
import orphans and the children of refugees, “who accumulate at our Western ports” as young as 
ten years old.71 Perhaps foreshadowing the orphan trains that would flood the West in the coming 
years, this suggestion bordered closely on the Republican philanthropy of the Kansas project, as 
it promised families free labor for about ten to fifteen years, while removing the burden of 
Northerners from caring for the children. Though the idea of obtaining wage labor was often the 
most cited reason for this movement, marriage was always an underlying theme. In one letter, 
however, Hale was express about this purpose. The main goal, he wrote, was the  
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necessity of providing wives for husbands, without compelling men to give up a year of 
life of work in emigrating to the East and back again…the small farmer in Oregon cannot 
leave his claim and come to the Atlantic States and return thither with his wife, without 
giving up many months to the expedition, and expending, at the very least, six or seven 
hundred dollars. The necessary work of the farm is set back an nearly a year is lost to 
him. All this to a poor man in a new community is a very great loss.72 
 
Although many women responded to the company circulars with enthusiasm, it was 
rarely, if ever because they sought marriage. Like Janet Miller, this migration effort was a way to  
gain more freedom and opportunity, enticed perhaps by Higgins’s boast that “girls here dictate 
their own being.”73 Louise Hannah, for instance, wrote the Company for information, stating that 
she was “strong and healthy and accustomed to work,” also thanking the Company for “taking an 
interest in the welfare of working women.”74 Charlotte W. Towne similarly wrote that she 
wished to go to Oregon to teach, perhaps convinced by the stories of female teachers from 
Lowell whom Asa Mercer took to the Washington Territory in 1865 who “were very soon 
employed at teaching and some of them are married.”75 Women who replied to the circulars, on 
the whole, responded to the opportunity the same way that men did in Kansas; with enthusiasm 
at the prospect of bettering their condition and wages, or with desperation, like settler Elizabeth 
Hume, who had been homeless since her son was killed in the Battle of Fredericksburg.76  
 As mentioned, Asa Mercer also contacted the NEEAC about promoting emigration to the 
Washington Territory. An advertisement titled “A change for the anxious and aimless” boasted 
that a steamer was prepared to take three hundred “lady passengers” to the territory completely 
for free, promising that upon arrival they would receive “good wages, to be paid in gold, and 
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have the added endorsement of probably marriage within three months, if they wish.”77 An 
organization called the Protective Association also sought to send women to Nevada and 
Colorado at the same time. Although the Company rejected both companies for lack of 
resources, their existence illustrates how well the idea of sending women West resonated with 
the Northeastern population.78 
 Still reeling from the Civil War and with rebuilding on the forefront of the nation’s mind, 
the Governor of Massachusetts and Senator B. F. Harding begged the company in January 1865 
to ask Congress for funding to aid the emigration scheme.79 Although this phase of the NEEAC’s 
work deviated from their general philosophy of philanthropy in that it was “a very simple 
charity…and it is a charity, which helps those who are left as well as those who go,” the Oregon 
migration project still bore the influence of their fundamental ideology.80 Even after the end of 
the war and slavery, the Company believed, even more strongly, that New England republican 
labor provided the best solution for the nation’s moral quandaries. Advertisements specifically 
asked for New England women, as they tended to be “intelligent, thrifty, energetic, and 
virtuous.”81 This monolithic description of a New England woman promised, “to make a Yankee 
proper” of the territory and its men.82 Women were expected to fall into the same roles they had 
filled in New England (one man wrote, “they cannot be too well educated—but at the same time 
a very important part of their education, and one which will be especially regarded by these 
practical fellows, will be their thorough acquaintance with housewifery”) the example of Jane 
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Miller and other migrants demonstrated that women took the opportunity to improve their own 
conditions, not necessarily to recreate their same lives in the West.83 The NEEAC continued to 
promote the migration of Northeasterners to form and shape the West, with the goal of 
improvement and the spread of republican principles.  
 After the migration to Oregon fizzled out for lack of funds, the NEEAC turned its eyes 
toward the promotion of Southern migration movements in Florida. Economically depleted and 
adjusting to a new system of labor after the war, the NEEAC saw the South as another 
opportunity for Northeasterners to escape the bustling population booms. Without the moral 
imperative of ending slave labor or the battle over popular sovereignty, which had effectively 
enticed Northern settlement in Kansas before the war, Republican philanthropy looked much 
more like land speculation than a partially charitable enterprise. Perhaps it is not surprising that 
in the postwar environment of carpetbagging, speculation, and skepticism that the Company 
could not continue its antebellum mission of optimism and overtly sectional colonization. 
 As early as December o1865, a mere eight months after Lee’s surrender at Appomattox, 
the NEEAC inquired about obtaining land in Florida for settlement. Original lines of inquiry 
centered on the ability to obtain Southern lands, especially under the confiscation laws.84 From 
the start, this NEEAC proposal was toned down from their intense involvement in Kansas affairs. 
They intended to circulate information and convince “separate families to go forward at their 
own charges (as all our emigrants have always done) and in their own way…we think we are 
safe in saying that our reputation through the Northern States is such that we can use a good deal 
of influence in any right direction.”85 While their reputation among New Englanders did give 
them some credibility, it is clearly false that the Company’s emigrants had always paid their own 
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fare and found their own way. With funds low, however, it did not serve company interest to 
advertise their former policies of obtaining discounted rates and providing land. Edward Everett 
Hale was once again highly involved in Company affairs. His inquiries to C.G. Barnard, who had 
just visited the region, were returned with enthusiasm. Barnard was convinced that “plantations 
must pass into Northern hands” and assured Hale of the “almost boundless openings for any 
colonies which we wish to plant” of Florida.86 Barnard emphasized that as soon as the war 
ended, that they should begin colonizing Florida with people that exemplified “all that is good in 
a New England village or town.”87 At the start of the Florida project, the Company again had 
noble goals, as Bernard put it, by “the hand of God,” they would “dot all the old slave states with 
circles of civilization which, shall, one day, impregnate the whole land.”88  
 In 1866, the Company took action. They officially employed General J. F. B. Marshall in 
December to investigate the feasibility of buying small farms in Florida to resell to Northern 
emigrants. This would relieve both the Northeastern population and siphon off European 
immigration (Hale was already “in correspondence with a prominent German and Scandinavian” 
for this purpose.)89 The NEEAC agreed to pay for General Marshall’s travel expenses along with 
a salary, as long as he provided them valuable information on the conditions of Florida, 
specifically information about the St. John’s River and the railroad line from Jacksonville.90 By 
this point, the company claimed that its main object “should be to get reliable information to help 
the poorer class of settlers who have not much time or money to spend in prospecting.”91 Hale 
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believed it essential to this mission, perhaps based on his past experience, to remind the settlers 
that they would not be going to “make their fortunes but to get their living by work.”92 
 They believed that they could use the Homestead Act of 1862 to obtain the land they 
desired in Florida. A.B. Stonelawe reminded the Company that under this law “each actual 
settler can obtain 80 acres of land” and believed that he could use the law to “sell land in any part 
of Florida at $5.00 to $6.00 per acre.”93 A year later, they looked to General Ely as an example, 
who was using the Homestead Act to buy “tracts of land for sale…suitable for colonizing” for 
three to nine dollars an acre.94 This dream ultimately ended in frustration for the Company, as 
they realized that the government would only provide land on individual cases, and not for land 
companies.  
 While the Company’s main function at this point was to obtain and provide information 
to settlers, their biggest responsibility lay in quelling the post-war fears of Northerners regarding 
the South, centrally their fear of the climate, the resistance of its people to Reconstruction, and 
the presence of freed people. A. B. Stonelawe wrote, at the advent of the project, that there was 
“perhaps no soil in America that to the eye of a New Englander could look more forbidding than 
that of Florida.”95 Indeed, perhaps nothing could be more different from the cold, harsh winters 
of New England than the tropical Floridian climate. Stonelawe continued his letter, reassuring 
the company that despite this trepidation, there was “no soil on this continent that will produce 
more saleable crops to the acre than can be raised here,” boasting that he had seen lands in 
middle Florida that had produced two hundred pounds of cotton per acre for over seventeen 
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years.96 W. H. Gleason similarly wrote Stonelawe a letter claiming, “sugar cane can be raised 
with less labor than in Cuba,” and could produce all “of the different products of the West-
Indies.”97 The NEEAC took these descriptions seriously, advertising in 1867, in a form letter, the 
advantages of emigration to Florida, including its “delightful climate, the variety of its 
productions and easy access to ready markets, we believe to be superior to those of any Southern 
State.”98 The other inducement of course, was its climate, which they believed would improve 
the health of those “whose delicate throats and lungs suffer in our harsh climate.”99 
 The goal of the NEEAC in promoting immigration was not merely speculative, but highly 
political. They not only had to convince Northerners that they would be safe in the former 
Confederacy, but also that they would be doing the nation a favor by trying to increase the 
Republican influence in the area. The company took great measures to reassure Northerners that 
moving to the South directly after the Civil War was not dangerous, and that Southerners 
welcomed their capital. Marshall met several plantation owners in Florida who “never wavered” 
in their loyalty, or were of Northern origin.100 Although they were “politically and socially 
ostracized by the secessionists,” they were well protected by the government.101  
Marshall even met with the Governor of the state, David S. Walker, for reassurance about 
safety. He wrote on several occasions about how Gov. Walker “is desiring of Northern 
immigration and says Florida will welcome N.E. settlers with open arms, feeling that in no better 
way can her prosperity be assured, than by and influx of Northern labor, capitol, and 
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enterprise.”102 Some Southerners even wrote the Company to assure them that the need for labor 
was so great, that emigration from Northerners was welcome.103 Furthermore, as far as Marshall 
could tell, all of the “low class ‘crackers’” who owned small farms, or no land at all, were 
especially willing to sell their land at cheap rates so that they could “go further south, where they 
can get out of Yankee neighborhoods, raise cattle, and drink whiskey in peace.”104  
 An ardent anti-slavery group prior to the war, the Company never identified as 
abolitionists in concern with the civil rights of African Americans. After the Thirteenth 
Amendment definitively ended slavery, the NEEAC had to contemplate what role freed people 
would play in their new colonization company. Much of the Company correspondence that 
concerned free persons looked at the project of a General Elys, who was attempting to create a 
black colony in Florida. Marshall worried that “the settlement of freemen in large bodies by 
themselves will not be a success” unless white workers were “among them to set them good 
examples of industry and direct the labor.”105 Marshall wrote that the opinion of most white 
Floridians was that the freed people should work on small farms, because “the Negros are not 
otherwise to be relied on.”106 The NEEAC continued in its general attitude about African 
Americans after the war as it did in the antebellum period. African Americans should be free, but 
they would be burdensome until they learned the value of Republican industriousness and free 
labor. Marshall wrote that he understood why freedmen were unwilling to work until they got 
better terms, but maintained an attitude of white paternalism.107 He directly compared the 
freedmen to children, writing that “It is natural to suppose that men seriously freed from the 
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restraints to which they have all their lives been subject, should not be as manageable as before, 
and like a boy with a new knife should be for some time experimenting with the sudden [sic] of 
freedom.”108 The Company saw the influence of northern education as the only real solution to 
the problem in Florida. Just as the NEEAC saw Northern education as essential in Kansas to help 
tame the West, it saw the instillation of Republican values as the way to integrate former slaves 
into the population. This idea accurately reflected the ideology of many other Northern groups, 
because by 1867 there were reportedly already “some thirty schools for Freedmen taught by 
Northern teachers.”109 
 The NEEAC did not end up doing much for freed people, except provide information to 
some societies that wanted to create black colonies in Florida. Dr. L. Miller wrote the Company 
in 1867, with a proposal to colonize Florida, at the suggestion of the Governor of Massachusetts. 
In a scheme that paralleled the American Colonization Society’s antebellum motivations, Miller 
also exuded white paternalism, writing that if he was not successful, the freed people “as they are 
at present situated, their destiny is to vanish rapidly away.”110 In the end, the war did little to 
change the mission of the Company, which still sought to instill Republicanism as the cure for 
sectional problems, and failed to change their ideological ideas about the recently freed people. 
A large portion of the NEEAC’s efforts was spent trying to sway the Floridian vote 
toward Republicanism. One company agent, J.M. Forbes, believed that “5000 voters introduced 
into this state will control it for the Union party. No other state in the South offers such 
inducements to the Union party to undertake such an organized immigration as was carried out in 
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Kansas.”111 In the aforementioned form letter produced and distributed by the Company, one of 
the major benefits advertised by the letter was political influence. It noted,  
“The small number of present inhabitants gives to each settler a proportionally large 
influence, and makes each colony a social and political power. From information already 
received, it is estimated that there are enough farmers and mechanics in New England 
alone, whose lives would be saved by a change of climate, to make Florida one of the best 
states in the Union.”112  
 
 Media coverage of the colonization effort was of central importance to the NEEAC, who 
had learned the importance of publicity in Kansas. One of Marshall’s first concerns upon his tour 
of Florida was that a “good Union paper” to replace the one currently in the State, which he 
described as “poorly printed and poorly constructed.”113 The Company chose Edward M. 
Cheney, former employee of the Christian Register, to run the paper in an arrangement similar to 
the one they had given to their Kansas agents years before.114 Cheney set out to make his fortune, 
selling all of his possession before the Company even had the money to send him out.115 
Cheney’s terms were thus: buy the Jacksonville Times for $2,000 at most and he would be 
entitled to all profits of the paper over eight percent on the amount earned. Additionally, he could 
buy the paper from the Company at any time by returning the $2,000 advance with interest.116 
And just as the Company trusted its agents too much in Kansas and suffered the consequences, 
Cheney overstepped his instructions. When Cheney arrived in Florida, he found the Florida 
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Times unwilling to sell, and quickly purchased The Jacksonville Union for $2,500. Hale scolded 
Cheney, writing: 
“What most troubles me in the matter is that you do not appear to understand our object. 
We have no desire to initiate a contest between the Loyal Papers. Certainly we do not 
expect to buy up Copper Head papers. At the earnest request of our Florida friends, we 
have attempted to serve them and the National cause in the matter of a paper.  
If they do not need our help in Jacksonville, it certainly seems to me that we can do better 
with our money than to attempt a second paper there.”117 
 
In a later letter Hale also reminded Cheney that the goal was to secure harmony for 
Florida Republicans, not cause further divides. This signaled a revision, if a slight one, of 
NEEAC policy before the War when the Company was happy to split the party if they could 
achieve their goals. In the end, the Company acquiesced to its agent, much as it had done with 
Charles Branscomb in Kansas. They agreed to buy the paper for Cheney, but retained the full 
title to the paper until he could pay it off in full.118 In the end, this action was the only real 
contribution that the NEEAC made the colonization of Florida. Cheney started the Republican 
State Executive Committee of Florida, which promoted stump speakers and “other legitimate 
expenses incidental to the upcoming election.”119 Despite their originally rocky relationship, the 
Company lauded Cheney and his political success as their own.  
By 1868, the Company’s Report consisted of a long list of disappointments. They 
rejoiced in their pamphlet (“obtained a large expense”) that set out to aid “in every way in their 
power in the work of reconstruction in that state” and the loyal newspaper run by Cheney.120 
They lamented that their plan to purchase large tracts of land for immigration resulted in failure, 
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which they blamed on the “unfortunate reality of investments of Northern Capitalists in cotton 
plantations at the South,” the tumultuous political climate, and the land itself.121  
In a 1954 history of the NEEAC, historian Samuel A. Johnson wrote that from 1857 
onwards, the Company’s ideas shifted from “crusading spirit to an attitude of business.”122 
Johnson argued that after this time, “the stress was laid on so managing the property so to return 
something to the stockholders.”123 Although Johnson correctly identifies the two most important 
components of the NEEAC’s republican philanthropy, morality and capitalism, they did not 
neatly fit into pre and post 1857 packages. Even the NEEAC’s philanthropic ventures after the 
war mixed these two elements into a complicated idea that charity did not have to be merely 
giving, it could also involved reciprocity. In many ways, every project that members of the 
Company discussed: Texas, Virginia, Central America, Oregon, or Florida, were efforts to 
recreate what they saw as their biggest triumph in Kansas. While it is tempting as a scholar to 
also focus only on the monumental Kansas projects, these later endeavors help trace the ideology 
of a generation. Although this vision was oftentimes complicated by war and financial trouble, 
what remains clear is that the Company never only wanted to profit, but generally cared about 
improving the morality of the nation by spreading what they deemed a superior ideology. 
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Chapter Four: Memory of the NEEAC 
 
History gives abundant proof, that a brief period of time has often determined the character and 
destiny of a nation. Such a period is properly called its controlling or dominating epoch.  
In the history of our own country, the year 1854 holds this commanding position, and governs all 
our subsequent years. It was in this year that the Slave Power attained its highest eminence, and 
demolished the last barrier that stood in the way of its complete supremacy and its perpetual 
dominion. In the same year, 1854, a power, before unknown in the world's history, was created 
and brought into use, to save to Freedom all our territories, then open by law to the possession 
and dominion of Slavery. This new power was an organized, self-sacrificing emigration.  
-Eli Thayer 
  
In 1887, at the age of sixty-eight, Eli Thayer set out to memorialize his greatest 
accomplishment in a work entitled The New England Emigrant Aid Company and its Influence, 
through the Kansas Contest, upon National History. In this book, Thayer lauded his own work in 
Kansas and the idea of “self-sacrificing emigration” as “a power, before unknown in the world’s 
history” that would “save to Freedom all our territories.”1 Thayer was convinced that there 
would never be “any danger that false conclusions about either the agency or its methods” would 
surface, and remained confident until his death in 1889 that historians would not skew his or the 
NEEAC’s motivations.2 Thayer took various measures to ensure that the history of the NEEAC, 
the historical “truth,” as he put it, would endure as the narrative of Bleeding Kansas, and indeed 
the epitome of the anti-slavery movement. His work became controversial, however, when he 
asserted that the NEEAC a far more influential group than the abolitionists. He specifically 
attacked William Lloyd Garrison’s organization as “inferior in numbers and far more inferior in 
influence. Its champions advocated Disunion as the ‘corner-stone of all true anti-slavery.’”3 
Garrison, who had died in 1879, still had a group of supporters who worked to uphold his 
public memory in the postbellum era. Soon after his death his children compiled a book that 
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presented him as he would have wanted, “as the single most insightful, heroic, and above all, 
significant leader in the abolitionists’ thirty year crusade to destroy slavery.”4 Both men had 
supporters in their camps that considered them to be the heroes of the antebellum period, and the 
ideological battles that they sparked before the war continued into the 1880s. 
One such battle was their differing ideologies about the best way to end slavery. Where 
Thayer considered himself anti-slavery, Garrison was an abolitionist.  As Lawrence Jacob 
Friedman writes, “Antislavery stands for the hope that slavery might ultimately disappear as a 
result of various developments and tactics, but immediate ‘abolition’ is a more precise term: An 
abolitionist had a compelling desire for immediate, complete, uncompensated emancipation and 
was at least moderately committed to civil equality for free Negroes.”5 For Garrison, this meant 
that Thayer’s gradual approach equated to colluding with the evil of slavery, and for Thayer, 
Garrison was an anarchist, bent on destroying slavery even at the cost of the Union.  
As David W. Blight demonstrates in Race and Reunion, the memory of this type of 
debate remains “difficult to shuck from its shell of sentimentalism.”6 Blight argues that the 
memory of the Civil War has since become “a story of how in American culture romance 
triumphed over reality, sentimental remembrance won over ideological memory.”7 Because of 
the complicated nature of memory, it turns out that Thayer did have cause for concern about the 
memory of the Company and his intentions. It is the radicals of the antebellum period, the 
Garrisons and the John Browns, who dominate history textbooks, and the North’s perception of 
its own role in the war. In today’s world we can see how this sentimentalism affects the way we 
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remember the Civil War. Books like Confederates in the Attic depict how some Southerners 
continue to celebrate the “lost cause” and the ideals of the Confederacy. Tony Horowitz 
demonstrates a Northern perspective on Southerners for whom the “remembrance of the War had 
become a talisman against modernity, an emotional lever for their reactionary politics.”8 While 
this lost cause mentality of the South remains a popular topic among scholars and in the public, 
perhaps what gets lost is the Northern tendency to similarly construct their own memory of the 
war to overstate Northern support of abolitionism. Examining the interaction between Garrison 
and Thayer and their attempts to shape the public memorialization of the antebellum period 
offers us a window into the complex ideologies of Northerners before and after the war. 
  Thayer began his efforts to ensure the NEEAC’s place in the history books almost 
immediately from its conception in 1854. When he won a term in Congress in 1857, he used this 
platform to remind others of the NEEAC’s sacrifice in Kansas just a few years earlier. In a 
speech entitled “The Central American Question,” given to Congress on January 7, 1858, Thayer 
asserted that the immigration plan that he used in Kansas should be applied to Central America. 
He drew many parallels between the two locations, and frequently cited his work in Kansas as an 
example for future immigration projects. He argued that an emigration movement in Central 
America would relieve the North of its excess population of foreign immigrants and 
benevolently transform the impoverished region into a reflection of New England. Thayer also 
began his work to present the NEEAC as the savior of Kansas, writing that before his work 
“there seemed to be no chance whatever for Freedom in Kansas, after the opportunity for Slavery 
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to enter there had been given.”9 He praised the “freedom-loving men” who ventured to the 
territory, and posited that the NEEAC as the perfect example of antebellum antislavery.  
 Thayer also established his aversion to moderates and abolitionists early in his 
congressional career. In a speech on February 24, 1859 entitled “Fair Play,” Thayer identified the 
classes of men within the Republican Party that he saw as problematic. The first were the 
“rigidly righteous,” who only wanted slavery abolished if the act proceeded “from the most 
exemplary and Christian motives.”10 Thayer denounced these Republicans for their strictly moral 
claims, stating that they should not ignore “economical or pecuniary” solutions to the problem of 
slavery. This reflected Thayer and the NEEAC’s view on the best way to eradicate slavery was 
through the standard of free labor. Another class of Republicans he denounced were the 
“preeminently-consistent,” who he stated were still trying to fix the problems of the past instead 
of finding new solutions.11 Finally, Thayer identified the camp that he deemed “political 
Cassandras,” those Republicans who “are always prophesying, in the middle of one great 
disaster, that another still great is about to come.”12 These politicians he deemed a “greater 
obstacle to our progress than the border ruffians” in Kansas because they quickly lost hope.13 
Thayer therefore advocated for popular sovereignty, for a “fair play” between slavery and free 
day. He also maintained that Northern values reigned superior. He noted that: 
When it was necessary to put some colonies into Kansas, I found no difficulty in having 
meetings in these towns and villages at very short notice. Plans were formed for making 
colonies, and for taking possession of the country in dispute, and thus the result 
contemplated was accomplished…How can a Southern planter hope to rival this speed 
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and readiness of transition?14  
 
Thayer was not only constructing the memory of Bleeding Kansas as the triumph of 
popular sovereignty and free labor ideology, he also began to bend the memory of the events to 
fit his current political agenda against other congressional Republicans. Thayer’s speech drew 
the lines for antebellum Republicans: there were those who opposed slavery on Christian, moral 
grounds, those who whimpered but did nothing about it, and those who harped about solutions 
without action. Clearly the most dangerous in Thayer’s mind, however, were the Garrisonian 
abolitionists, 
who are dissatisfied, and who are inclined to invoke a certain deity I think a false 
deity which presides over a portion of this Union; a deity which has been invoked by 
great men on great occasions, and by little men on little occasions, for a long time past a 
deity in whose expected presence both the people and the politicians have sometimes 
stood aghast when “‘he’, ‘in prospect only,’  from his horrid hair shook pestilence and 
war." This sulphurous god is Disunion.15 
 
Thayer found the abolitionist desire for “disunion” the most disturbing faction of all, and 
dreaded the idea of splitting the Union. In the late 1850s, Thayer had already begun to draw the 
lines his debate with the abolitionists after the war by constructing popular sovereignty and 
immigration as the best solutions to the antebellum problems in contrast to abolitionism. 
It was not only Thayer, however, that sought to memorialize the NEEAC in Bleeding 
Kansas before the Civil War erupted. The desire to name Kansas’ cities after prominent New 
Englanders demonstrated their attempt to transform the West into a reflection of New England, 
and also to leave a permanent reminder of the Company’s role in the creation of white settlement 
in the state. The first city settled by the NEEAC was named after Amos Lawrence, one of the 
company’s original members. Although they kept the Indian names for the cities of Topeka, 
Osawatomie, and Wabunsee, they also named Manhattan and Burlington after Northeastern 
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cities. This act of town naming, especially in Lawrence, signaled an effort to memorialize 
NEEAC efforts in the region.  
During the war, the Company further emphasized their role in Bleeding Kansas to 
Congress. In 1863, Company secretary Thomas H. Webb petitioned Congress to pay the 
Company back for its hotel in Lawrence, which had been destroyed by pro-slavery forces on 
May 21, 1856 during the “Sack of Lawrence.” Webb reminded them that the Company had 
opened the west “up to civilization” and provided “benefits and blessings of society” to the 
region.16 He then proceeded to write that David Atchison, who was once President pro tem [short 
for pro tempore] of the U.S. Senate, led the charge against the hotel, burning it violently to the 
ground in an act that resulted in Bleeding Kansas.17 Although this attempt at memorialization 
demonstrates that the Company did remain active during the war, it was mainly after the conflict 
that they jockeyed for position in the history books. 
Thayer’s The New England Emigrant Aid Company and its Influence was the first spark 
in the postbellum debates with Garrisonians. This book consisted of two lectures that he gave 
before The Worcester Society of Antiquity the year before, along with his personal notes. In it, 
Thayer told the same triumphant story that he began years before in Congress. He vividly 
remembered the split between Northerners in two groups—“one was political, and opposed to 
Slavery extension in a legal way,” and “the other was sentimental and contented for the 
overthrow of Slavery by revolutionary methods—advocating the dissolution of the Union as the 
best and only sure way.”18 Thayer continued that while the first group, the Free Soil Party, had 
good intentions, it crumbled at the first sign of loss. When Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act, he wrote, the Party’s “leaders were silent in their despair, or spoke only to lament their 
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defeat.”19 On the other side of the argument, lay the “sentimental” party of William Lloyd 
Garrison, which Thayer commented “advocated Disunion as the ‘corner-stone of all true anti-
slavery.’”20 Thayer then directly quoted Garrison in an 1856 meeting as proposing that,  
Resolved: That the one great issue before the country is, The Dissolution of the Union, in 
comparison with which all other issues with the Slave Power are as dust in the balance; 
therefore we will give ourselves to the work of annulling this 'covenant with death' as 
essential to our own innocency, and the speedy and everlasting over-throw of the Slave 
System.21 
 
 Thayer outlined the reasons that Northerners had “no sympathy” for the cause of 
abolitionism and “their methods were everywhere condemned.22 While he admitted that the 
abolitionists had “good motives,” he argued that they were ineffective, anti-religious (“By their 
own showing a quarter of a century spent in denouncing the church, the clergy and the Union had 
accomplished nothing”), extralegal, and caught in the snares of Garrison’s pride.23 Thayer further 
quipped that Northerners had always detested slavery, but preferred “legal and constitutional 
methods only, and always for the Union.”24  
Caught between these two camps, one of which was despondent, the other of which 
promised destruction, Thayer believed that Northerners waited with baited breath. He quipped,  
There was silence deep as death, 
While we floated on our path; 
And the boldest held his breath 
For a time.25    
 
But this was only for a time, because Thayer himself came up with the perfect solution to 
the extension of slavery. Thayer did not fall into either camp, because he did not feel “the 
depression and despondency that so affected others who regarded the cause of liberty as 
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hopelessly lost,” nor did he care to destroy the Union like the Garrisonians. It was after many 
weeks of worry that Thayer was given the answer by revelation, for a plan of organized 
immigration.26 
Thayer praised the NEEC, and wrote that their efforts caused the South serious alarm and 
roused the “border ruffians” into action. His work became so popular, he posited, that crowds 
surrounded his emigrant routes “as far west as Chicago” with “continued ovations.”27 Thayer 
continued that Garrison’s “peculiar clique” broke their silence about the situation in Kansas and 
“opened their batteries of vituperation upon it and its authors, as they had always assailed every 
practical and feasible measure, and everybody who proposed to do something for the cause of 
freedom.”28  
In comparison to his successful efforts in Kansas, Thayer argued that Garrisonians were 
not only ineffective, but they also “accomplished nothing,” and even encouraged the growth of 
slavery.29 Instead of taking legal pathways to restricting slavery, as had Congressmen of the 
eighteenth century, Thayer claimed “during the entire period of Mr. Garrison's efforts for 
disunion…Slavery was unrestricted, and made steady progress.”30 He claimed that abolitionism 
had not only been ineffective, it had in fact actively worked against the end of slavery. He wrote 
that by,  
Demanding immediate emancipation, they strove to retard the overthrow of slavery. 
Contending for the dissolution of the Union as the only means of destroying Slavery, they 
saw Slavery destroyed not only without their aid, but against their protest, while the 
Union was preserved and made permanent and harmonious.31 
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Thayer’s arguments against the Garrisonians were heavily influenced by their current 
actions as well. Although he made most of these jabs in his added notes, it is clear that Thayer’s 
main objective was to provide the historical “truth” in comparison to their current claims. He 
wrote that despite their clamor for disunion, when secession actually occurred, the abolitionists 
“had sense enough not to insult the outraged sentiment” of the North.32 Instead, he wrote, they 
waited until the war was over, at which point they “were the loudest in the jubilee over the 
restoration of the ‘grand and glorious Union’ which they, and they alone, had saved!”33 Thayer 
was revolted that Garrison was dubbed “the father of anti-slavery” and that Northerners 
retrospectively seemed to have forgotten Garrison’s lack of loyalty.34    
Thayer believed that the ultimate dishonor to the NEEAC was that the abolitionists stole 
the credit for their work in Kansas in historical memory of the period. Thayer fumed that, 
The present generation has, in consequence of the persistent clack and endless scribbling 
of that class, come to believe that Mr. Garrison was the Alpha and Omega of the anti-
slavery struggle, and that he and his small party of followers were the leaders and 
directors of the great movement that brought about the overthrow of Slavery. These men 
and women have never exhibited any diffidence or modesty in sounding their own 
praises.35 
 
 Essentially, Thayer became upset that many Northerners who before the war did not 
support immediate emancipation retroactively supported the Garrisonian view. Thayer griped 
that abolitionists, in fact, “had come to be despised at the North, and they were neglected and 
shunned by the better element.”36 He reminded his audience that this distaste of abolitionism was 
so vehement about Northerners that when he settled Kansas, he had to ressure dozens of people 
that he was not affiliated with Garrison. In the end, this discrepancy in popular memory, which 
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Thayer called “exaggerated and distorted,” was the entire reason he felt the need to give his 
speeches and publish their transcriptions.37  
In order to remind Northerners about their true feelings about Garrison, Thayer 
specifically drew on pieces of his ideology that he considered offensive to his audience. He 
argued that abolitionists had no faith in the power and superiority of New England, citing 
Garrison for writing that the South “has never yet been foiled in her purposes thus concentrated 
and expressed.”38 As for Northern emigration as a solution, Thayer reminded his audience that 
Garrison said that he “never had any faith in it as a breakwater against the inundation of the dark 
waters of oppression.”39 As further insult to Northern superiority, Thayer quoted Thomas 
Wentworth Higginson as saying that emigration would be useless if all it did was transplant 
Massachusetts, which  “had been tried and found wanting.”40 To make sure his audience was 
thoroughly offended, and more likely to turn against the abolitionists, Thayer also reminded 
them that Garrisonians turned against the churches. He again quoted Garrison directly for saying 
that “the American Church continues to be the bulwark of Slavery, and therefore impure in heart, 
hypocritical in profession, dishonest in practice, brutal in spirit, merciless in purpose,—‘a cage 
of unclean birds’ and ‘the synagogue of Satan.’”41 Thayer culminated his evidence of Garrison’s 
anti-northern sentiment with a reminder to New Englanders about what made them great. He 
reminded them of the high order of their race, writing that although “Latin races claim that their 
founders were nursed by a wolf. The Saxons have a higher origin. Their founder was nursed by a 
polar bear. Deep in the nature of this race is found that untamable ferocity, which fears nothing, 
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but can endure everything.”42 Thayer argued that Northerners were industrious, virtuous, and 
racially pure, and therefore could and did accomplish a great moral and practical feat in Kansas.  
Abolitionists had disagreed with Thayer’s plan from the start. They found Thayer’s idea 
of philanthropy as a capitalistic enterprise disturbing, because they opposed slavery on wholly 
moral grounds. (Thayer despised this attitude, of course, and wrote that an abolitionist told him 
that he would “rather give over the territory to Slavery than to make a cent out of the operation 
of saving it to Freedom.”43) Garrisonians immediately dismissed Thayer’s plan in 1854 with a 
resolution that stated: 
Resolved: That the idea of starving slavery to death by confining it within its 
present limits, is, in view of the fact, that the larger part of the territory already secured to 
the Slave Power, is, as yet, virgin soil, on which it can grow and fatten for ages to come; 
a most dangerous delusion.44 
  
 So when Thayer returned years later wielding the same assaults against abolitionism, the 
Garrisonians responded in kind. Without Garrison alive to defend himself, Oliver Johnson took 
the helm. Johnson was the editor a Boston newspaper called The Christian Soldier that shared an 
office building with The Liberator in the 1830s. Johnson became close friends with Garrison 
thereafter, editing his papers when he took trips to Europe and writing a biography of him upon 
his death.45 When Johnson heard about Thayer’s book, he immediately took to defending his 
friend and countering his arguments, which he considered “boastful in its tone, exaggerated in its 
claims, and positively vituperative toward the Abolitionists, who created the agitation which 
gave him his only hope of success.”46 
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Johnson once again refuted the idea that gradualism and capitalism were useful solutions 
to the immorality of slavery. He drew particular attention to his disgust with Thayer’s idea of 
philanthropy as a moneymaking affair. He called Thayer’s goal to be both self-sacrificing and 
money making “a flavor of craftiness that repelled the Abolitionists.”47 He also denied the 
originality of the plan, reminding Thayer that the American Colonization Society theorized about 
immigration as a gradual solution to slave labor since the 1820s. Because of this unoriginality, 
Johnson especially scoffed at Thayer’s claim that he came to the idea by revelation. He noted 
that Thayer’s “application of an old idea to new circumstances” would have left “small need of a 
special revelation.”48  
Johnson further contested Thayer’s claims about the futility of emotional appeal against 
slavery. Although Thayer critiqued abolitionists for their sentimental appeals, Johnson quipped 
how humorous it must have been for Thayer to realize that “A million dollars was not to be 
raised without ‘sentimental’ appeals.”49 Johnson argued that the Garrisonians sought to change 
hearts and minds, while the NEEAC “invited not moral but a physical conflict,” financed by 
Sharps rifles and bloodshed.50 Although Thayer had spent a good portion of his criticism 
outlining the ideas of violent disunion of the Garrisonians, Johnson objected that abolitionists 
“hoped for the peaceful abolition of slavery…they could not themselves begin a war; if it must 
come, the South should strike the first blow.”51  
  Johnson turned Thayer’s argument around on him, pointing out that Thayer could not 
simultaneously claim to have agitated the Civil War and also blame the Garrisonians for 
disunion. Further, he refuted Thayer’s evidence against Garrisonians as “wholly and stupidly 
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false,” especially when it came to debating the idea of disunion.52 Johnson explained that 
Thayer’s mistake was his memory of the antebellum period. Thayer assumed that the “Union 
existing before the war is the same that exists today,” while the Garrisonians merely recognized 
that the old Union was already defunct and not to “beat a dog already dead.”53 
In at least one way, Thayer was correct about the abolitionists: they did not want to 
continue with the American Constitution as it stood. Johnson ridiculed Thayer’s devotion to the 
American Constitution, and argued that the only way to end slavery was to break with the 
document that held slaves as property. Because Thayer’s plan involved the absolute upkeep of 
the Constitution, Johnson argued that gradual approaches like emigration would never solve the 
problem of slavery. He retorted, “It was as hopeless to expect that States thus bound by the 
Compromises of the Constitution could abolish slavery, as that a man with one foot held fast in a 
huge steel trap, and both hands manacled, could successfully cope with a wild beast.”54 These 
debates over gradualism and immediatism almost exactly mirrored the types of arguments 
Americans had before the war, but the memory of the conflict kept them alive for intellectuals 
after the conflict. Johnson and Thayer’s squabbles over ideology demonstrate that the war did 
not end differences in opinion, even among Northerners. 
 As for the work actually done in Kansas, Johnson argued that the abolition of slavery was 
not the work of any single group, but instead “vast multitudes of men and women bore a 
creditable part.”55 Johnson flatly refused Thayer’s claim that the abolitionists were ineffective in 
Kansas. Johnson responded that “in charging the abolitionists with ‘doing nothing’ for the final 
overthrow of slavery” he supposed that Thayer was taunting them for standing aloof from the 
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war.56 This was an inaccurate and insulting claim, wrote Johnson, because it ignored the fact that 
thousands of abolitionists had gone to war for the Union, including Garrison’s own son. 
Just as Thayer’s argument had its main root in defending his own historical memory, 
Johnson’s argument was fundamentally centered in leaving a correct historical record. Johnson 
wrote that although he certainly held many of Thayer’s views in low regard, he did commend his 
action in Kansas for winning the support of many Northerners to the cause of anti-slavery. He 
did not doubt that Thayer hated slavery, but emphasized, “some of Mr. Thayer's flagrant 
misrepresentations demand attention; not, however, on personal but on purely historical 
grounds.”57 He reminded him that “if he aspires to be its historian, should be careful to do no 
injustice to those who labored for the great end by means different from his own, or in ways that 
he did not wholly approve.”58 Johnson further remarked that if history would do the movement 
justice, it would seek not to “perpetuate the memory of unwholesome controversies and personal 
animosities,” but rather would show the power of Americans to overcome the great evil of 
slavery.59 While the subject of these debates mirrored those in the antebellum period, the greatest 
difference in the arguments was over the construction of American memory and how the years 
leading up to the war would become characterized and remembered.  
Johnson firmly dismissed Thayer’s claim that the Garrisonians were purposely projecting 
themselves as heroes. He argued that it was not the Garrisonians who were recreating events, but 
Thayer, who was trying to boost his own egotism. Johnson wrote that Thayer’s “pages fairly 
bristle with the perpendicular pronoun ‘I’ in every form of ostentation” and that he was “hardly 
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the man to rebuke the Abolitionists for setting up unfounded claims in their own behalf.”60 This 
would have never been the goal of Garrison, Johnson continued, “who could never listen to 
praises of himself without a protest.”61 Any public memory attributed to Garrison, in the eyes of 
Johnson, was a just reminder that Garrison was the first to “repudiate the delusion of gradualism” 
and that even those who previously despised abolitionists came to see their correctness.62  
By this point, Johnson and the Garrisonians had the clear advantage in Northern popular 
memory. At various points in his refutation, when Johnson wanted to refute a specific insult 
made by Thayer (in one case that abolitionists were “a fraternity of mountebanks”), he listed 
great numbers of famous abolitionists, taunting Thayer’s arrogance in insulting such famous and 
influential men.63 At one point he wrote, “Who is Mr. Thayer, that, like Shimei, he should come 
forth to stigmatize with insulting epithets such men and women as these?”64 Johnson here refers 
to Shimei of the Old Testament, who opposed King David’s rise to the throne of Israel and cast 
stones at him and his followers. This reference both to an extensive list of abolitionists, who 
Johnson likened to the holy followers of David, suggests that there was already a popular idea in 
the North that abolitionists had been the ones that defeated slavery. If the abolitionists had 
continued to be ostracized as they had in the antebellum period, these references would hold no 
weight. Instead, Johnson cast Thayer in the role of Shimei, whose backwards ideas and insults 
look foolish in light of King David’s ascension.  
This debate surrounding gradualism, immediatism, and the memory of the antebellum 
period did not only occur between Johnson and Thayer. Both had advocates and supporters, and 
all jockeyed for position in the collective memory of the North, with most Unionists in favor of 
                                                 
60
 Johnson, The Abolitionists Vindicated in a Review on Eli Thayer’s Paper, 20.  
61
 Johnson, The Abolitionists Vindicated in a Review on Eli Thayer’s Paper, 20.  
62
 Johnson, The Abolitionists Vindicated in a Review on Eli Thayer’s Paper, 21.  
63
 Johnson, The Abolitionists Vindicated in a Review on Eli Thayer’s Paper, 17.  
64
 Johnson, The Abolitionists Vindicated in a Review on Eli Thayer’s Paper, 18.  
  
98
Garrison. Poems and songs lauded Garrison, especially after his death, as a hero of the Union. 
James Russell Lowell's Tribute to Garrison ended with the verse,  
O small beginnings, ye are great and strong, 
Based on a faithful heart and weariless brain; 
Ye build the future fair, ye conquer wrong, 
Ye earn the crown, and wear it not in vain!65 
 
Lowell attributed Garrison for building a better future for America and earning his crown 
as the King of anti-slavery. Johnson reminded his audience that when President Lincoln met with 
the Governor of South Carolina, “he attributed emancipation not alone to the fidelity of the 
soldiers, but to the ‘logic of Garrison.’”66 There was even more damning evidence that President 
Lincoln had disliked Thayer and his plans for immigration. In 1861, Eli Thayer wrote two letters 
to Lincoln to outline his plan for a “cheaper & safer method” to save the Union.67  He suggested 
that the Government “enforce a homestead” to encourage “planting…in sufficient numbers 
colonies of loyal men from the North & from Europe” into rebellious states.68 Thayer suggested 
Virginia and Texas as viable options, but reasoned that it would work well in any Southern state. 
Although Thayer was convinced that this would secure “the perpetual loyalty of the Southern 
States,” Lincoln never answered.69 In fact, Lincoln heartily disapproved of Thayer’s plan as a 
concession to slave power. At one point during the Secession Crisis, he wrote to Thurlow Weed 
that “Eli Thayer’s Pop. Sov. Would lose us every thing we gained by the election.”70 Lincoln’s 
disapproval of the NEEAC’s plan as a concession to slave power helped cement American 
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memory against the Company, as Lincoln remained the greatest fallen hero of the Civil War in 
Northern memory. 
Garrison’s funeral further perpetuated his public perception as a great American hero and 
leader. As the Reverend Samuel May eulogized Garrison’s life: 
Never before was that life more potent for good than at this moment; never before did he 
live, as he lives now: lives in the laws of the land, lives in a renovated Constitution, lives  
in the hearts of all true lovers of our country and of man…For death does not narrow the 
influence of such a life,  but enlarges it ; it gives the last needful pressure to the  weight 
which stamps its image ineffaceably in history and  upon humanity.71  
 
By the time of his death, Garrison’s legacy in American history had been set. May was 
correct in his prediction that Garrison’s life would only continue to enlarge and increase in 
importance, especially as the United States started the long process of combating its thorny racial 
legacy. 
Thayer was not alone, however, in attempting to commemorate the NEEAC’s legacy in 
Kansas. In February 1881, several members and guests of the Kansas State Historical Society 
met to honor him and add his marble bust to their collection. In their remarks on Thayer, guest 
speakers remembered him with great respect as a zealot who secured Kansas. Major J.B. Abbott, 
an original settler in the territory, wrote that the Company’s conception was “noble” and that 
more was due to Thayer than to any other person in eradicating slavery.72 Another man familiar 
with the NEEAC commented as well. Charles Robinson wrote that without Thayer “Kansas and 
the country would have been cursed with slavery to this hour.”73 The current Governor of Kansas 
praised Thayer as “an educated, cultivated Eastern man” who saved the West by his zeal for 
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freedom.74 A former Governor reached the pinnacle of this excitement when he told the that 
providence had brought salvation to Kansas in the form of Thayer and the NEEAC, much as “the 
day that Moses was raised up and qualified to be the deliverer of his people.”75  
In the New England Magazine in 1897, Professor William H. Carruth of the University of 
Kansas also wrote in support of the Company. Although Dr. Carruth was not affiliated with the 
Company in any way, he wholeheartedly accepted their ideology, especially when it came to 
Northern superiority. He praised the NEEAC for their moral purity, and wrote, “it was absolutely 
true that no questions were asked any settler as to the motives with which he went, nor was a 
cent ever given to a settler for the purpose of assisting him.”76 Carruth responded to the criticism 
that the NEEAC were land speculators when he provided evidence that the Company sold its 
stock in Kansas land in 1862, and thereafter had no speculation in Kansas.77 He simultaneously 
praised the innate morality of Northerners in their successful settlement of Kansas. Carruth wrote 
that it was the “practical bent of New Englanders which united so curiously with its idealism” 
that produced the project that “proposed to settle the slavery question, without more talk” by the 
simple process of establishing religion in Kansas.78 This process paid off, according to Carruth, 
because “Kansas furnished a larger proportion of young men to the Union army than did any 
other state.”79 Another Professor also followed suit in a history of Kansas, writing that no one, 
“unless, he is ignorant of the facts in the Kansas struggle, or is completely blinded by malice or 
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envy” would ever “attempt to defraud the Emigrant Aid Company of the glory of having saved 
Kansas.”80  
Thayer was not the only member of the NEEAC that took to writing in defense of the 
company in the postbellum period. Edward Everett Hale wrote several books defending the 
historical memory of the NEEAC, including one entitled New England in the Colonization of 
Kansas. Hale believed that the reason that the Garrisonians dominated the history books was a 
generational gap in memory. He wrote, “our generation has forgotten the excitement of the great 
Missouri controversy; indeed every generation has to repeat the experiences and lessons of its 
founders.”81 
Hale also echoed Thayer’s claim that the Garrisonian focus on destruction negatively 
impacted efforts to end slavery. Although Hale used less aggressive language than Thayer, he 
excluded the abolitionists from a long list of people who he deemed influential in the settlement 
of Kansas. He wrote, “the list includes names of none of those whom we now call the old Anti-
Slavery war-horses. These gentlemen distrusted any action which did not look to the destruction 
of the Union.”82 A true believer in the company ideology, Hale kept strongly to the party line 
that Thayer promoted. Hale truly believed that the NEEAC and domestic immigration had made 
the difference in the antebellum debates over slavery. He wrote that: 
The moral effect of this act through the whole country can hardly be described. It cannot 
be overstated. It was like what one sees, when, at a given movement, watched for and 
prayed for, a great vessel, which seems likely to miss stays in her voyage, feels, happily, 
one strong gust of a favoring gale, and sweeps forward in her career as her master has 
determined.83  
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 Beyond defending the morality and necessity of the Company, Hale also defended 
Thayer himself against criticism. Hale wrote that “until Kansas was a free state” Thayer “gave 
his time, his money, and his life to the establishment of freedom.”84 Despite this post war 
ambiguity and debate over support, Thayer still remains a minor character in the story of anti-
slavery, while Garrison had already won the upper hand by the 1880s. 
On the surface, all of this jostling over memory could appear to be nothing more than 
petty squabbling over two men’s egos. Historians have most often presented Thayer as a shrewd 
businessman who used the politics of the day to earn a quick profit. They mention him in the 
category of “impractical visionary” and have doubted his sincerity, arguing that his “first purpose 
was to make money, and only incidentally to make Kansas free.”85 Nicole Etcheson, whose 
history of Bleeding Kansas remains a seminal work on the subject, described Thayer briefly as a 
man who “spied his opportunity for profit in promoting emigration to Kansas.”86 In the most 
comprehensive study of Thayer himself, Samuel Johnson claimed that he sought to gain political 
profit, and claimed that he “loved notoriety and noise.”87 A closer look at this debate, however, 
shows that although Thayer of course wanted credit, he also truly wanted to present the historical 
“truth” of the antebellum period. He wanted to remind the North that most of them were just like 
him before the war—advocates of antislavery and Unionism, not proponents of disunion and 
violence.   
This also was not merely a personal dispute with a long time rival. Thayer did not only 
object to Garrisonians or abolitionists, but anyone who he felt misrepresented his vision. For 
example, he lambasted a historian only known at T.W.H. for writing “nonsense” about Kansas. 
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He wrote that T.W.H’s account of the NEEAC was so egregiously incorrect that if the author 
should “ever enlarge the sphere of his labors so as to include the writing of sacred history, we 
shall probably learn that Barabbas and the two thieves were the founders of the Christian 
religion.”88 Just as Thayer worked tirelessly to spread the message of the NEEAC before the war, 
he continued to preach his view of capitalistic philanthropy as the best option to change a 
region’s ideology. This strategy did have some practical application as well, as the NEEAC was 
seeking stock subscriptions for its work in Oregon and Florida. By defending the ideological 
principles and actions of the company in Kansas, Thayer was both protecting its ideological 
legacy and advocating for it to be adapted to current problems of Reconstruction.  
Both Thayer and Garrison played an important role in the antebellum anti-slavery 
movement. Although unpopular at first, Garrison’s ideology of immediate abolition became the 
destiny of the nation during the Civil War. Garrison rightly has been memorialized for his 
crusade against slavery and continues to be celebrated by Americans as a historic hero because 
his ideas perpetuated the coming of the Civil War and importantly, he represents the racial 
equality that many Americans cherish.89  
Although Thayer can perhaps be faulted in retrospect for his gradual approach to the 
eradication of slavery, his idea for a nonviolent emigration movement did influence popular 
sovereignty in the fight for the freedom of Kansas. Despite the urge to define Thayer as a 
swindler caught in the traps of financial scheming, it is clear that he, as well as many of the 
immigrants who settled with his company, truly believed in the immorality of slavery, the 
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promises of religious revivalism, and the superiority of the principles of free labor. Thayer 
continued to fight for his ideas after the war because he still believed that the emigration of 
Northerners to areas of moral or economic decay held the key to “civilizing” them. 
Garrison’s triumph over Thayer in the history books was, in many ways, a product of the 
winner writing the dominant historical narrative. Many school children learn that the North was 
full of abolitionists, set on immediately granting freedom to African Americans. Their 
philanthropic mission for slaves was an entirely moral imperative in which no man or woman 
sought personal gains. What does not fit into this narrative of the Civil War was the fact that 
Northerners like Eli Thayer and the NEEAC subscribed to a more popular nineteenth century 
ideology that promoted gradual emancipation and a solution that would take on moral and 
capitalistic imperatives.  
 Thayer and Garrison’s supporters demonstrate that the ideological conflicts of the 
antebellum period did not disappear, even after the conclusion of the war. In the face of immense 
toll of the conflict, both personally and collectively, some Americans continued to wonder if 
gradual solutions like immigration could have prevented the widespread despair. The fact that 
Thayer continued to debate with Garrisonians after the war over the best ideology both shows 
that the ideas of the antebellum period continued to be debated after the war, and even applied to 
problems of Reconstruction. Should emigration be used to reconstruct the South, as the NEEAC 
was trying to do in Florida? Should the West continue to be the frontier for emigration 
movements, as would occur with the Exodusters? Should former slaves receive the benefits of 
the Constitution immediately, or gradually? In many ways, the debates of Thayer and Garrison 
over the memory of Kansas and their respective ideologies foreshadowed the many debates of 




 In today’s world philanthropy has essentially the same perception as charity. A person of 
wealth gives their time or money to a group or person in need with no expectation of personal 
benefit. Americans today shudder at the thought that certain philanthropic ventures only give 
twenty percent of their funding to charity, or that directors of non-profits own million-dollar 
homes. But in some ways, philanthropy is about reciprocity and benefit. As Andrew Carnegie 
learned in the twentieth century, even if that benefit is not immediately financial, cultivating a 
good reputation can have its own set of benefits.  
Nineteenth century philanthropists were more transparent about how they expected their 
work to benefit them. In a time when capitalism was intertwined with morality, companies like 
the NEEAC embraced both their capitalistic and moralistic impulses. The roots of the American 
philanthropic tradition in antebellum American not only served the needy or fulfilled a 
benevolent purpose; they also overtly served the founders, morally, financially, and politically. 
The NEEAC’s ideas were rooted in the moral principles of the Second Great Awakening and 
rising anti-slavery sentiment, the Republican ideal of free labor, and a feeling of sectional and 
racial superiority. This complex view of philanthropy was not hidden in the shadows of doing 
good for others, but was firmly rooted in making money and selling stocks. Expanding the 
history of philanthropy beyond the constraints of a twentieth century urban environment 
illustrates how the NEEAC came to typify a new type of moral crusade and settlement strategy.  
While historians have been hesitant to acknowledge the Company as anything beyond a 
fringe society with a stubborn leader, the NEEAC’s widespread support from many different 
parts of New England suggests a more representative ideology. Thayer may have been an egotist 
or a zealot, but respected members of the Boston intellectual community embraced his ideas, 
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some (like Edward Everett Hale) even until their deaths. The NEEAC provides an invaluable 
lens into the Northern mentality before the Civil War. Their embrace of gradulaism, non-
violence, and colonization helped them achieve their goals of “civilizing” the West and those 
who lived there, as well as fight against slave labor. Their ideology also demonstrates just how 
important New Englanders found their region for the upkeep of the nation. For them, New 
England stood as a bastion of proper Christianity, education, and intellect, and their “self-
sacrificing” emigration held the key to transforming the rest of the nation.  
Historians who analyze immigration to Kansas rarely consider the impact of Indian 
removal just the year before in 1853. Although the New Englanders saw their migration as a 
movement into vacant land, they exemplified what settler colonialism means for both the 
colonized and the colonizer. White settlers in Kansas continued to promote a policy of 
eradication and assimilation for the Natives, a policy that would continue to travel west with the 
settlers. The white scramble over preemption was not a new story, but demonstrated that the 
NEEAC further reflected the mindset of many Northerners.  
Their philanthropic vision and ideology did not stop at Kansas, although many historians 
are content to evaluate the Company only within that context. The NEEAC’s success in Kansas 
fueled their conviction that immigration held the key to transforming the nation. In Texas and 
Virginia before the Civil War, this meant using New Englanders to starve slavery as they did in 
Kansas. In Oregon, this meant sending women en masse to promote moral upkeep. In Florida 
during Reconstruction, this meant establishing a Republican newspaper and promoting Northern 
occupation. For Thayer, this even meant leaving the United States in benevolent missions to 
conquer Central America. In many ways, this ideology and justification for mass migrations was 
present again in support of early transnational imperial projects, such as the Spanish American 
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War. The NEEAC once again provides an ideological link to a line of reasoning that justified 
sparking conflict in order to obtain land for “benevolent” purposes. Extending the narrative of 
the company beyond Kansas provides a different perspective on the Company and their ideology 
and shows that they saw this embrace of popular sovereignty as a solution to many dilemmas, 
not just the expansion of slavery.   
 Further, the NEEAC demonstrates that despite Northern mythologies about widespread 
support of abolitionism, there were many diverse ideologies in the North before the war, many of 
which did not include immediate emancipation. These debates also continued well after the war, 
as members of the NEEAC continued as major intellectual players on the national stage 
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.  
Their vision of philanthropic capitalism therefore transcended the Civil War and Kansas. 
It came to encompass a way in which many Northerners believed they could end slavery without 
a war, relieve excess population in urban areas, promote Christianity and “civilization,” and even 
reconstruct the South. Although their ideology grew out of fashion with a new generation of 
reformers who saw gradualism as a compromise rather than a solution, the NEEAC holds the 
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